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WILL DUE PROCESS BE RETURNED TO ACADEMIC
SUSPENSION?: AN ANALYSIS OF ACADEMIA’S
REJECTION OF THE TITLE IX FINAL RULE
Andrew F. Emerson, Esq.+
In 2011, the Department of Education ("DOE") under the Obama
administration issued its Dear College Letter ("DCL") ordering publicly funded
educational institutions to undertake aggressive actions to deter what was
deemed an epidemic of sexual violence on college campuses. DOE subsequently
aggressively enforced the directives of the DCL with scores of costly
investigations of college disciplinary systems and threatened withdrawal of
federal funding for institutions that failed to respond to sexual harassment
claims aggressively. Hundreds of lawsuits followed in the wake of the DCL's
issuance. Specifically, the flood of litigation was initiated by males contending
they were briskly expelled, suspended, or otherwise disciplined upon collegiate
tribunals' findings of guilt on claims of sexual harassment. The lawsuits
portrayed collegiate systems that readily found accused males responsible on
claims of sexual harassment through denial of fundamental due process rights
and predetermined conclusions that equated the claim of sexual harassment with
guilt on the charge. The majority of these lawsuits resulted in recognizing the
deprivation of rights for the accused males in the universities' rush to judgment
on sexual harassment claims. In May 2020, the DOE, under the Trump
administration, released its Title IX Final Rule comprehensively addressing all
aspects of publicly funded educational institutions' obligations in responding to
claims of sexual harassment. The Final Rule's eighty-two sections created a
procedural framework for adjudicating Title IX sexual harassment claims based
solely on the determination of the factual validity of the complainant's
allegations. Academia has unceasingly opposed the Final Rule from its original
November 2017 publication for public comment. Repeatedly, the charge is made
that the Final Rule will inevitably unleash a pandemic of sexual violence against
collegiate women.
Joseph Biden campaigned for the presidency with a commitment that the Final
Rule would be swiftly and surely rescinded. Accordingly, President Biden issued
an executive order in March 2021 as the administration's first step in
eradicating the Final Rule. However, the Final Rule has proved to be a law
immune to swift elimination. A series of lawsuits seeking to overturn the Final
Rule failed. Moreover, the Biden administration's actions have acknowledged
that the Final Rule can only be rescinded and replaced through compliance with
+
Mr. Emerson graduated with honors from the University of Georgia School of Law and was a
member of the Georgia Law Review. He was a civil trial attorney in Dallas, Texas for over 25
years. Presently, he is a professor of law at Western Carolina University.
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the Administrative Procedures Act and its public comment requirement. DOE
has indicated a proposed replacement or drastic revision of the Final Rule will
be published for public comment in April 2022. Thus, the Final Rule will likely
remain an enforceable law throughout 2022. The public comment period will
inevitably be contention as the Final Rule is one of the many issues on which
America is deeply divided.
This article undertakes a history from the 1972 enactment of Title IX through
the present setting forth the administrative, legislative, and judicial events that
have led to the nation's deep division over the role of government in pronouncing
and enforcing permissive sexual practices on college campuses. It concludes
with considering the motivations underlying academia's consistent hostility to
the Final Rule.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2020, the Department of Education released its Title IX Final
Rule comprehensively addressing all aspects of publicly funded educational
institutions’ obligations in responding to sexual harassment.1 The Final Rule
creates a procedural framework for adjudications of Title IX sexual harassment
claims predicated exclusively upon determinations of the factual validity of the
complainant’s allegations.2
Academia has unceasingly opposed the Final Rule from its original November
2017 publication for public comment.3 Opposition to the Final Rule has
reflected two common themes. Academia initially contends the Final Rule
would inevitably result in a pandemic of sexual violence against women enrolled
in colleges and universities. It further laments the Rule’s implementation of a
“one size fits all” system that eliminated discretion in fashioning a Title IX
disciplinary system that would best serve a school’s unique characteristics,
resources, and needs.
The Obama administration pursued a laudable goal of limiting the incidence
of sexual assault on college campuses.4 Equally commendable was the zealous
pursuit of justice for collegians that are victims of sex crimes. The nine years
preceding implementation of the Final Rule had witnessed unfortunate tactics
adopted by educational institutions in pursuing such policies. The period was
1. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2020) [hereinafter
the “the Final Rule” or “Rule”] (official statutory Title IX and codification — The Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a) (2018)).
2. § 106.
3. See infra notes 225, 232, 278–84 and accompanying text (reviewing summary of the
public comments offered by academia to the Final Rule and responses of the academe’s
representatives). Use of the terms “academia” or “academe” throughout the article is not intended
to reference opposition to the Final Rule by each institution of higher education. The terms
reference the great majority of responses to the Final Rule forthcoming from publicly funded
universities and colleges. See e.g., infra notes 277–353 and accompanying text (respectively
discussing the opposition to the Final Rule of the American Council on Education, as a
representative of numerous colleges and universities and the Association of Title IX Coordinators).
There is undeniably a distinct minority that applauds the Final Rule. Neither should reference
herein to the conduct of campus disciplinary tribunals be taken to preclude those select schools that
sought to preserve fairness in adjudicating sexual harassment claims over the course of time herein
reviewed.
4. Alison Solin, Colleges and Students are Better off now that Obama era “Dear Colleague”
Letter Rescinded, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://pacificlegal.org/colleges-studentsbetter-off-now-that-obamas-dear-colleague-letter-rescinded/ (observing that seeking to deter
sexual harassment is a worthy pursuit, but not at the expense of suppressing free speech and
deprivation of due process rights).
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marked by the rise of Title IX collegiate disciplinary systems frequently
conceived to issue predetermined findings of guilt for male students accused of
sexual harassment.5 Males adjudged responsible for Title IX violations
systematically received attendant penalties of suspension or expulsion from the
institution.
The collegiate adjudications were customarily swift and
unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation of the decision.
Former and suspended male students, with means sufficient, soon responded
with lawsuits brought against the universities and their employees coordinating
or dispensing the Title IX verdicts.6 The early cases initiated a wave of litigation
resulting in over six hundred similar legal proceedings between 2012 and 2020.7
Customarily identified by the pseudonym “John Doe,”8 the plaintiffs sought
reinstatement with judicial declarations vacating the campus disciplinary rulings
that had branded them sexual predators. The allegations of the John Doe
lawsuits revealed collegiate systems that equated the filing of the Title IX
complaint with the male’s guilt. Similarly emerging from the John Doe
allegations was a portrait of disciplinary proceedings that consistently afforded
the accused male only little semblance of due process in the investigation and
rendition of final determinations on the Title IX complaints.9 The wave of John
Doe lawsuits culminated in 2018 through 2020 with a series of federal appellate
court decisions. Several of the federal circuits reprimanded educational
institutions for conducting proceedings with deprivations of due process.
Ironically, the federal opinions recognized reverse gender discrimination against
males in the campus sexual harassment proceedings as plausible claims under
Title IX.10
Among numerous influences leading to academia’s distaste for the Final Rule
was the gradual but dramatic evolution of thought among a distinct sector of the
intelligentsia that rejected axioms of American thought. The emerging
5. See infra notes 73–92, 166–206, and accompanying text (reviewing the collegiate Title
IX adjudicatory systems during the period of 2011 through 2017).
6. See infra notes 93–95, 220–21 & accompanying text (reviewing the history of the John
Doe lawsuits and judicial responses to requested relief).
7. See Title IX Legal Database, TITLE IX FOR ALL, https://www.titleixforall.com/title-ixlegal-database/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2021) [hereinafter Title IX Database] (providing a
comprehensive data base itemizing Title IX litigation since 2013). See also Campus Due Process
Litigation Tracker, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/research/campus-due-process-litigation-tracker/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2021) [hereinafter FIRE] (tracking due process cases arising against
educational institutions arising from Title IX disciplinary proceedings).
8. The hundreds of lawsuits brought by aggrieved males are herein referenced as the “John
Doe Lawsuits” and plaintiffs in the lawsuits identified collectively as “John Does.” The anonymous
term was employed to protect the privacy of the individual plaintiffs. A litigant’s request to employ
an anonymous name requires a rebuttal of a presumption of the openness of judicial proceeding,
with a required showing of the following by the litigant: “(1) fear of severe harm, and (2) that the
fear of severe harm is reasonable.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596
F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010).
9. See infra notes 76–92, 162–206 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 137–38, 154–59 and accompanying text.
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philosophy abandoned long-standing principles defining lawful sexual
interactions between men and women.11 Never before would non-violent acts
or speech, such as an attempt to hold hands on a date, a post-date email
expressing the sexual attractiveness of the individual, or a telephone call
requesting a second date have been deemed potential sexual harassment.12 Over
decades, the ideology resulted in a significant change to college campuses
through the Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”).13 The OCR’s success was aided
by a judiciary that progressively deferred to the agency’s ever-expanding
definition of its jurisdictional authority. Deference to the OCR was
complimented by courts’ historical reluctance to intervene in colleges and
universities’ internal administration. While this emerging ideology has
impacted the culture of college campuses primarily through Title IX campus
offices, it is only one of numerous factors that led to campus injustices over a
decade. By no means do academics walk in lockstep with this new perception
of appropriate sexual interaction.
Section I will briefly review the administrative pronouncements and judicial
decisions that transformed Title IX into the primary federal tool to redress
perceived sexual misconduct on college campuses. Section II will examine
OCR’s enforcement methods in securing compliance with the 2011 Dear
Colleague Letter and the resulting emergence of collegiate disciplinary systems
fiercely devoted to sexual harassment investigations and adjudications with all
too frequent predetermined outcomes. Section III chronicles the ensuing wave
of John Doe litigation by aggrieved males, the Trump administration’s
revocation of the Dear Colleague letter, and the growing trend of judicial
intervention to redress collegiate disciplinary systems’ injustices. The remedial
principles underlying the Final Rule’s creation of a quasi-judicial system for
campus adjudications and summaries of the Rule’s resulting provisions will be
reviewed in Section IV. Section V will review academia’s response to the
regulations and the concerted efforts to repeal or substantially modify the Final
Rule. Section V additionally considers the Final Rule’s future viability as
controlling law in the face of the executive, legislative, and litigants’ attempt to
render it a nullity.14 This article concludes with a Section examining the
11. See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
12. See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 892–95
(2016) (tracking resulting legislation requiring publicly funded universities to include in reporting
of sexual criminal activity incidents that would not be considered crimes in a jurisdiction); infra
notes 45–50 and accompanying text (tracing the Office of Civil Rights subsequent notice to
universities of sexual harassment including unwelcome conduct or speech and the consequences of
outlawing acts and speech never before deemed harassment).
13. The Office for Civil Rights was created in 1979 by the Department of Education
Organizations Act. Pub. L. No. 96–88, § 203, 93 Stat. 668, 673 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §
3413 (2018)).
14. See, e.g., Laura Meckler, Biden Directs Fresh Review of Title IX Rule on Campus Sexual
Assault, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2021, 6:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/bidentitle-ix-campus-sexual-assault/2021/03/08/1fce95f2-7fa9-11eb-9ca6-54e187ee4939_story.html
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motivations underlying academia’s rejection of the Final Rule and forces at play
on college campuses leading to the widespread opposition. Meaningful analysis
of the academe’s opposition to the Final Rule requires revisiting historical events
in an environment ripe for the colleges’ commitment to systems of injustice in
Title IX adjudications.
I. THE ENACTMENT & HISTORICAL EXPANSION OF TITLE IX CULMINATING IN
THE 2011 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER
A. The Origins & Evolution of Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits federally funded
educational institutions from engaging in sexual discrimination: “[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”15
Title IX’s minimal legislative history sufficiently indicated the law’s
fundamental purpose was to promote gender equality in educational
opportunities for institutions receiving federal funding.16 In the wake of Title
IX’s enactment, judicial decisions soon emphasized that gender equality in
education included equality of opportunity in schools’ athletic programs.17 A
1974 amendment to Title IX, sponsored by Senator Javits, codified the
legislative intent for gender equality in athletic opportunities in Title IX.18
However, nothing in the legislative history or language of Title IX suggested
that the statute’s prohibition of gender discrimination was intended to redress
sexual harassment or sexual violence on college campuses.19
(reviewing President Biden’s March 8th instruction for Department of Education to review the
Final Rule as a first step in unraveling the regulations).
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). The legislative enactment and entire statutory scheme of
Title IX is cited as follows: Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, 373–375 (1972) (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2018)). The Supreme Court of the United States has described the law
as a contract whereby federal funding of educational institutions is conditioned on the institution’s
agreement not to discriminate. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998).
16. Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty
Legal Developments that Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 326–27
(2012) (citing 117 CONG. REC. 406–07 (1971) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (stating that the
proposed Title IX language was “taken from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act” as “educational
opportunity should not be based on sex, just as we earlier said it should not be based on race,
national origin, or some of the other discriminations”).
17. Anderson, supra note 16, at 329 n.17 (citing Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d
1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1973)).
18. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018)) (requiring HEW (“Health, Education, and Welfare”) issuance of Title
IX regulations that offered “reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports”).
19. See KC JOHNSON & STUART TAYLOR, JR., THE CAMPUS RAPE FRENZY, THE ATTACK ON
DUE PROCESS AT AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES 154 (2017) (ebook) (citing ESTIMATING THE
INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 154–55 (Candace Kruttschnitt, William D. Kalsbeek
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Subsequent decades have witnessed Title IX’s emancipation from its original
moorings, directly outlawing gender discrimination in educational opportunities.
A stream of administrative agency advisory interpretations on Title IX’s scope
and implementation, coupled with judicial deference to such pronouncements,
has transformed Title IX into something of far greater consequence than a mere
proscription on sexual discrimination in education. Title IX evolved into an allencompassing license for the issuance and enforcement of federal directives
concerning lawful sexual activity on college campuses.
The initial expansion of Title IX beyond the parameters of gender
discrimination occurred in the decade after its enactment. The Supreme Court’s
1979 recognition of an implied private cause of action for victims of Title IX
discrimination was premised upon furthering the statute’s stated goal of
affording meaningful protection for victims of gender discrimination.20
However, Cannon’s recognition of an implied private cause of action constituted
a significant step in the growth of the statute’s coverage in light of the 1977
federal district court opinion in Alexander v. Yale University.21 The court in
Alexander concluded that Title IX’s ban on gender discrimination in education
encompassed a prohibition on “sexual harassment” occurring in the facultystudent context.22 The recognition of sexual harassment’s proscription under
Title IX laid the foundation for a dramatic expansion of the statute’s coverage
two decades later.23 The interpretation of Title IX as a prohibition on teacherstudent harassment24 portended the statute’s ultimate role in empowering the
OCR to define and police lawful sexual behavior in academia.25
& Carol C. House eds., 2014)); R. Shep Melnick, The Strange Evolution of Title IX, 36 NAT’L
AFFS. 19, 20 (2018), https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-strange-evolution-oftitle-ix (discussing the shift in Title IX’s focus over time). See also MARTHA MATTHEWS &
SHIRLEY MCCUNE, TITLE IX GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES: AN INTRODUCTORY MANUAL 8–9 (1976)
(outlining a laundry list of possible grounds for the filing of grievances under Title IX with no
inclusion of sexual harassment); Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,
J., dissenting) (discussing the absurd outcomes resulting from interpretation of Title VII’s
prohibition on gender discrimination as prohibiting sexual harassment).
20. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704–07 (1979).
21. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4–5 (D. Conn. 1977), aff’d, 631 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1980) (refraining from a determination of whether Title IX created a private cause of action).
22. Id. at 3–4 (plaintiff alleging reduction of a student’s grade based upon her rejection of a
professor’s proposed quid pro quo involving sexual demands).
23. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039 (Mar. 13, 1997) (pronouncing through OCR
that Title IX included the affirmative obligation of a university to deter a “hostile environment” of
sexual harassment even when attributable to student-on-student discrimination).
24. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 345–59 (1990) (reviewing the anomalies in classifying sexual
harassment as sexual discrimination).
25. See infra notes 35–50 and accompanying text. The concept of sexual harassment as a
strand of gender discrimination was conceived by Catherine McKinnon, a prominent feminist
writer who served as adviser to the plaintiffs in the Alexander case. See Tyler Kingkade, How a
Title IX Harassment Case at Yale in 1980 Set the Stage for Today’s Sexual Assault Activism,
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While judicial decisions were critical in Title IX’s expansion, the statute’s
ultimate role as a dominant star in the constellation of educational law was the
product of “bureaucratic sex creep.”26 In 1980, the newly created Department
of Education (“DOE”) and its OCR were delegated authority to implement
regulations in the furtherance of Title IX and issue guidelines for
interpretation.27 OCR aggressively assumed the oracle’s role on all matters Title
IX. Over decades it issued numerous letters to federally funded institutions,
providing guidance on implementation and clarifications that consistently
expanded both the scope of Title IX’s coverage and the corresponding statutory
obligations of publicly funded universities.28 When confronted with cases
implicating Title IX interpretations, courts ultimately accepted the agency’s
pronouncements as authoritative.29
The OCR’s aggressive expansion of Title IX’s jurisdiction found additional
support in two legislative acts. The 1990 adoption of the Clery Act,30 as
amended and supplemented by the Violence Against Women Act of 2013
(“VAWA”), constituted the primary legislative acts premised upon the
assumption of a pandemic of sexual misconduct against college coeds and the
necessity for dramatic governmental intervention.31 As amended by VAWA,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2014, 1:15 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/title-ix-yalecatherine-mackinnon_n_5462140.
26. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 884–85 (2016) (defining “bureaucratic sex creep” as
“the steady expansion of regulatory concepts of sex discrimination and sexual violence to the point
that the regulated area comes also to encompass ordinary sex”).
27. See id.
28. See Melnick, supra note 19, at 21–22 (tracing the extended history of OCR’s jurisdictional
expansion of Title IX using agency’s clarification and guidance letters and avoiding the issuance
of proposed regulations that would be subject to public comment). See also Gersen & Suk, supra
note 12, at 897–99 (citing OCR’s 1997 guidance letter as the critical publication in OCR’s
transformation of Title IX from legislation merely regulating the duties of the schools to a law
authorizing issuance of directives on students’ sexual conduct).
29. See Melnick, supra note 19, at 21 (tracing the deference of federal courts to OCR’s
numerous administrative pronouncements on the scope and compliance requirements of Title IX).
See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(requiring federal courts in their interpretation of an unclear statute, to defer to any “reasonable
interpretation” of the statute issued by an administrative agency that was delegated authority to
enforce the statute).
30. Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2018) [hereinafter the “Clery Act”]. Mandatory reporting of criminal activity is
covered in subsection (f). The Clery Act was originally enacted as part of the Student Right-toKnow and Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104 Stat. 2381 (codified, as
amended, in scattered sections of Title 20 of the United States Code), which amended the Higher
Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified, as amended, in scattered
sections of Title 20 of the United States Code). In 1992, the Clery Act was amended to require the
development and implementation of specific policies and procedures to protect the rights of sexual
assault survivors. See Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, § 486(c), 106
Stat. 448, 621-22 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (2012)).
31. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 892–97 (observing VAWA’s vague definitions of
criminal sexual offenses and resulting expansion of reportable crimes under the Clery Act). VAWA
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the Clery Act required federally funded schools to provide the DOE with
statistics on the incidents of criminal acts and the steps being taken by schools
to address these acts.32 However, VAWA’s vague definition of reportable
“sexual assault” to include “dating violence, domestic violence, and stalking”
required Cleary Act reporting as “criminal acts” occurrences that were not
designated crimes in the jurisdictions where the respective schools were
located.33 Clery Act reports from 2010 through 2014 suggested a dramatic
increase in sexual assault on college campuses, thus supporting the OCR’s
depiction of rampant sexual violence and the necessity of heightened vigilance
in addressing acts that had never been conceived as criminal conduct in
redressing sexual harassment.34
The OCR’s continued expansion and redefining of conduct encompassed by
the prohibition on sexual harassment found support in select feminist writings.
Catharine MacKinnon’s works exemplified feminist publications urging that
sexual misconduct could no longer be restricted by the mens rea and actus reus
defining rape or other sex crimes. Instead, the female’s subjective feelings of
being violated in the aftermath of sexual intercourse were primarily
determinative of misconduct.35 This obfuscation of the elements of sexual
expired and the Reauthorization Act of 2019 failed to secure congressional passage., VAWA Faces
Hard Road Ahead, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/government_affairs_office/aug20-wl-pdf.pdf (identifying the difficulties
in attempts to secure congressional renewal of VAWA). As of March 2021, VAWA has yet to
secure Senate reauthorization. Susan Davis, House Renews Violence Against Women Act, but
Senate Hurdles Remain, N.P.R. (Mar. 17, 2021, 5:14 PM); Coed, YourDictionary.com,
https://www.yourdictionary.com/coed (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (“A coed is defined as a female
student.”).
32. Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 892. VAWA’s amendment to the Clery Act expanded
the definition of sexual criminal acts to include noncriminal acts, with the following explanation:
Although we recognize that these incidents may not be considered crimes in all
jurisdictions, we have designated them as “crimes” for the purposes of the Clery Act.
We believe that this makes clear that all incidents that meet the definitions in [VAWA]
must be recorded in an institution’s statistics, whether or not they are crimes in the
institution’s jurisdiction.
Violence Against Women Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 62,752, 62,764 (Oct. 20, 2014) (codified at 34 C.F.R.
§ 668 (2015)) (expired).
33. Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 892 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1)(F)(iii) (2013)).
34. Clery Act reports for the period of 2012 through 2014 included aggregated sexual assaults
on college students between 4,558 and 5,335. JOHNSON & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 46 (citing
Campus Safety and Security, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC.,
https://ope.ed.gov/campussafety/#/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2021)). Cristina Marcos & Julie Grace
Brufke, House Passes Bill to Renew the Violence Against Women Act, THE HILL (Mar.17, 2021,
05:20 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/43720-house-passes-bill-to-renew-violenceagainst-women-act/ (noting the House passage of a bill to renew VAWA that had expired in 2019).
35. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 20 (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, A Rally
Against Rape, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED; DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 81, 82 (1987)). Harvard
Law Professor Jeannie Suk Gersen has reviewed the OCR’s continuing efforts to familiarize
collegians with revised concepts of Title IX sexual harassment. Suk summarizes OCR’s efforts at
redefining acceptable sexual conduct in the following terms:
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violence would ultimately leave collegiate disciplinary tribunals with largely
unfettered discretion in determinations of guilt on complaints of Title IX sexual
harassment.36
B. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
The OCR’s Dear Colleague Letter (“DCL”) of 2011 was a comprehensive
demand for publicly funded universities to declare war on a wave of sexual
violence.37 Its nineteen pages offered in exacting details the programs and
tactics to be immediately adopted by the universities to eradicate rampant
campus sexual assault. OCR’s portrayal of the epidemic of sexual violence was
premised upon the assertion that twenty percent of women attending college
were victims of actual or attempted sexual assault.38 The legitimacy of the
DCL’s unqualified claim that one out of five collegiate women are victims of an
attempted or completed sexual attack has been roundly criticized, mainly on the
basis that the supporting surveys readily classified many instances of lawful
sexual conduct as “assaults.”39 The one in five statistic has been further

We are giving young people the idea that the unhappiness that they have about their
relationships is a matter to be taken up with the authorities. . . . In this very large
continuum of unpleasant interactions that can happen, at some point you draw a line and
say, ‘‘These are consensual, these are not consensual.”
Wesley Yang, The Revolt of the Feminist Law Profs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/the-revolt-of-the-feminist-law-profs/. See also, Melnick, supra
note 19, at 30–31 (describing the common practice of collegiate Title IX coordinators and their
staff in conducting campus sessions with students devoted to educating on new concepts of
acceptable and unacceptable sexual conduct and appropriate discourse on sex). A second strand of
long-held feminist thought was destined to be a central premise of the Title IX sexual misconduct
in the era of the Dear Colleague Letter (2011-2017). See Edward Greer, The Truth Behind Legal
Dominance Feminism’s Two-Percent False Rape Claim Figure, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 947, 947–
48 (2000). Legal Dominance Feminism (LDF) posits that women do not lie when making
accusations of sexual violence. Id. at 948. By 2000, LDF was widely accepted with scores of
academic articles premised upon the theory’s validity. Id. at 949 & n.11 (listing articles premised
upon the assertion that less than 2 percent of rape accusations were false).
36. See infra notes 47, 107, and 147 and accompanying text (alleging 100 percent findings of
guilt for males on at least one Title IX count for certain designated semesters at Miami University
of Ohio and Oberlin College).
37. Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for
Civil Rights, to Title IX Coordinators (Apr. 4, 2011) (rescinded 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104_pg3.html/. See generally NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, OCR
Investigation Tool Kit: Cooperation, Advocacy and Asserting the District Point of View, at 2,
https://cdn-files.nsba.org/s3fs-public/06-Silverman-session-OCR-Guidance-summary-FINALPaper.pdf/ [hereinafter “DCL”] (noting that between 2009 and 2015 the OCR issued twenty-eight
guidance letters prefaced with the introduction “Dear Colleague”).
38. See DCL, supra note 37, at 2.
39. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 49 (observing the Campus Sexual Assault
Study (“CSA”), cited as support in the DCL, included as reportable “sexual assault,” women’s
responses of having “experienced ‘rubbing up against you in a sexual way’ or “‘had intimate
encounters while even a little bit intoxicated.’”).
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undermined by the observation that such a rate of sexual violence would require
a rate of 400,000 to 500,000 assaults per year in order to attain the required total
of two million victims of the ten million total women attending college during a
four to five year period.40
The DCL proceeded to list numerous mandates and practices to be
immediately implemented by publicly funded educational institutions in
redressing sexual violence. Notably, the DCL’s multiple directives were cast in
mandatory terms and were aggressively enforced as de facto law for six years.41
Despite its many mandates, the letter was never subjected to the Administrative
Procedure Act’s (“APA”)42 required procedures for an agency’s enactment of
binding regulations.43 The DCL culminated the OCR’s ascendancy as a final
word on acceptable sexual conduct on campus. OCR’s subsequent relentless
enforcement of the DCL’s directives would reveal the agency’s deep
commitment to broadening the parameters of illicit sexual behavior to
encompass lawful sexual activity on campus.44
Predictably, the DCL’s articulation of sexual prohibitions was nebulous and
open-ended. Sexual harassment included: “unwelcome conduct of a sexual
nature…” including “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical behavior of a sexual nature.”45 Further
The wording of similar campus surveys continued after issuance of the DCL and has been similarly
critiqued. See, e.g., Greg Piper, The Massive New Campus Sexual-Assault Survey Has One Giant
Design Flaw, COLLEGE FIX (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.thecollegefix.com/the-massive-newcampus-sexual-assault-survey-has-one-giant-design-flaw/ (observing an Association of American
Universities survey including sexual relations while “incapacitated” defined with the conclusory
tautology “incapacitated due to drugs or alcohol”); Ashe Schow, Five Myths and Outright Lies
About Campus Sexual Assault, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Aug 31, 2018), https://www.
mindingthecampus.org/2018/08/31/five-myths-and-outright-lies-about-campus-sexual-assault/
(noting that surveys of collegiate women concerning sexual assaults on collegiate women
frequently do not inquire concerning sexual assaults, but inquire concerning “unwanted
behaviors”).
40. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 46.
41. See Larry Alexander et. al., Law Professors’ Open Letter Regarding Campus Free Speech
and Sexual Assault [hereinafter Law Professors’ Open Letter], 1–2 (May 16, 2016), http://online.
wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Law-Professor-Open-Letter-May-16-2016.pdf (criticizing
the DCL and numerous other OCR letters as cast in mandatory terms of “must” or “shall” despite
never having constituted enforceable regulations)
42. 5 U.S.C. § 551–59 (2018).
43. Sheridan Caldwell, Note, OCR’s Bind, Administrative Rulemaking and Campus Sexual
Assault Protections, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 463–73, 486 (2017) (concluding the DCL mandates
were not enforceable regulations due to OCR’s failure to fulfill the APA’s required publication and
period for public notice and comment). See also, Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An
Essay on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 387, 394 (2015) (criticizing the OCR’s issuance of the DCL with its mandates for adjudication
of sexual harassment without preliminarily affording notice and period for public comment).
44. See Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 930 (observing “[t]he conduct classified as illegal by
the sex bureaucracy has grown substantially, and indeed, it plausibly covers almost all sex students
are having today.”).
45. DCL, supra note 37, at 3.
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obscurity was added with the DCL’s inclusion of a footnote adding the
following:
Title IX also prohibits gender-based harassment, which may include
acts of verbal, nonverbal, or physical aggression, intimidation, or
hostility based on sex or sex-stereotyping, even if those acts do not
involve conduct of a sexual nature. The Title IX obligations discussed
in this letter also apply to gender-based harassment.46
The OCR’s all-encompassing and ill-defined statement of “sexual
harassment” left college disciplinary panels and single investigators in Title IX
adjudications to render subjective determinations concerning the propriety of
students’ actions and words.47 OCR’s all-encompassing definition of sexual
misconduct was in direct contradiction of the Supreme Court’s definition of Title
IX sexual harassment as “harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational
opportunity or benefit.”48
One could only ponder the parameters of “unwelcome.” Would this include
an attempt to hold hands after a date that the female concluded had not gone
well? If a social meeting was to end with a kiss, must the male initially seek
affirmative consent? If the couple was engaged in a “hookup” proposed by the
female, was the male required to intermittently pause and obtain verbal
confirmation for more intimate physical contact? The DCL offered no guidance
in defining “consent” to sexual activity. The obscurity of the term led to a
proliferation of “affirmative consent” requirements at universities nationwide.49
The OCR’s letter included no text reconciling the forbidden “unwelcome verbal
content” with the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech.50

46. DCL, supra note 37, at 3 n.9.
47. See, e.g., Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2020) (allegation of 100
percent of accused on Title IX claims were found responsible on at least one count during the school
year with judge’s opinion observing “one could regard this as nearly a test case regarding the
College’s willingness ever to acquit a respondent sent to one of its hearing panels during the 2015–
16 academic year”).
48. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 632 (1999).
49. Jake New, The ‘Yes Means Yes’ World, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (October 17, 2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adopting-affirmativeconsent-sexual-assault-policies (observing 800 schools’ adoption of an affirmative consent
requirement).
50. See FIRE Response to OCR ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter on Universities’ Obligations
Regarding Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault, FIRE (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www.thefire.org/
fire-response-to-ocr-dear-colleague-letter-on-universities-obligations-regarding-sexualharassment-and-sexual-assault/. FIRE articulated the significant issues raised by the DCL by its
open-ended definition of sexual harassment in the following terms:
While the concerns about sexual violence emphasized in the letter and concerns about
free speech may seem unrelated, it is important to understand that overly broad, vaguely
constructed campus definitions of sexual harassment have served as a major justification
for abuses of student free speech rights for over two decades. Unless sexual harassment
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The DCL was remarkable in its exclusive focus on affording comfort and
redress to the student complaining of sexual harassment when contrasted with
its deafening silence on procedural guarantees owed one accused of sexual
harassment in the adjudication of the claim. Equitable, aspirational phrases such
as “prompt, thorough, and impartial” and “opportunity for both parties to present
witnesses and other evidence” were sprinkled throughout the DCL.51 However,
the letter offered no specifics on the implementation of procedures to accomplish
such equality. The DCL devoted two sentences in nineteen pages to the rights
of the accused.52 Previous OCR guidance documents had included entire
sections articulating the accused’s rights in the ultimate determination of guilt
or innocence on a harassment claim.53
The DCL departed from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of “actual
knowledge” of sexual harassment as triggering the school’s obligation to
respond to sexual harassment and substituted an affirmative duty on the schools’
part to pursue a campaign to eliminate the underlying causes of supposed
pervasive sexual violence.54 The Supreme Court’s “actual knowledge”
requirement as a condition precedent to the school’s duty to respond to a claim
of sexual harassment was expanded to include constructive knowledge.55 The
DCL’s near-exclusive concern with the accuser in sexual harassment
adjudications, with the accused as an afterthought, is illustrated by the following
omissions, guiding principles, and excerpts:
Nothing in the letter requires that a live hearing be held on
the charges. If a hearing is held, the accused and the
accuser’s school is strongly encouraged by OCR to not
allow cross-examination by each other in the school’s
adjudication of the claim of sexual violence.56

is properly defined, it is FIRE’s experience that such vague regulations too often serve
to excuse the punishment of protected speech.
Id.
51. See DCL, supra note 37, at 5, 9.
52. See id. at 5.
53. See Kelly Rice, Understanding the Implications of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter: Why
Colleges Should Not Adjudicate On-Campus Sexual Assault Claims, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 763, 774,
775 n.113 (2018) (contrasting the DCL with earlier OCR guidance documents devoting entire
sections to the rights of the accused).
54. See DCL, supra note 37, at 4 & n.12 (distinguishing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. Of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629 (1999)).
55. DCL, supra note 37, at 4 & n.12. The Supreme Court had refused to recognize
constructive knowledge as the basis for the school’s liability in a private action under Title IX:
[W]e conclude that it would “frustrate the purposes” of Title IX to permit a damages
recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on
principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual notice to a
school district official.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1999).
56. DCL, supra note 37, at 12.
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A school’s grievance procedures must use the preponderance of the evidence
standard to resolve complaints of sex discrimination.57
1. The school is not required to afford parties the right to retain
an attorney to participate in any aspect of the proceeding. In
the event the school elects to allow a party to retain counsel,
the other party additionally must be afforded the right to
counsel.58
2. The school’s duty to conduct a Title IX investigation is not
required to await completion of the police investigation.59
3. The school is encouraged to have an appeals process. In the
event of an appellate process, both parties must be allowed
the right of appeal of the findings or remedy.60
4. Schools may be required to respond to student-on-student
sexual harassment that occurs off the campus, or outside the
education program or an activity of the school.61
5. Resolution of the claim should be done expeditiously with an
average period of 60 days for investigation.62
6. “Public and state-supported schools must provide due process
to the alleged perpetrator. However, schools should ensure
that steps taken to accord due process rights to the alleged
perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX
protections for the complainant.”63
The DCL’s fallacious justification for a preponderance of the evidence
standard was its analogy to the evidentiary standard in Title VII civil
proceedings.64 The rationale failed to address the Supreme Court’s conclusion
that a higher standard of proof is required when reputational damage of this
magnitude would flow from a verdict of guilt.65

57. DCL, supra note 37, at 11.
58. DCL, supra note 37, at 12.
59. DCL, supra note 37, at 10.
60. DCL, supra note 37, at 12.
61. DCL, supra note 37, at 4.
62. DCL, supra note 37, at 12.
63. DCL, supra note 37, at 12.
64. DCL, supra note 37, at 11 & n.26 (referencing to the preponderance of the evidence
standard in Title VII proceedings).
65. See Professor’s Open Letter, supra note 41, at 2 & n.22 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 424 (1979)) (observing that a low standard of evidence has been deemed inappropriate
in a proceeding involving damage to reputation). See generally Stephen Henrick, A Hostile
Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY.
L. REV. 49, 62 & n.59 (2013) (citing congress and others that have concluded that the standard
must be higher for such disciplinary proceedings); Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 901 (observing
the preponderance of the evidence standard as being wholly an invention of the OCR unveiled in
the DCL).
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II. THE OCR’S MULTI-YEAR ENFORCEMENT OF THE 2011 DEAR COLLEAGUE
LETTER
A. The OCR’s Crusade of Enforcement of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter
through Collegiate Investigations, Publication, & Threats of Withdrawal of
Public Funding from Education Institutions
OCR immediately commenced a multi-year crusade of coerced compliance
with the DCL’s many directives to federally funded educational institutions.
The agency’s devices for pressuring campus compliance included threats,
humiliation, and myriad interventions on campus. Complaints to the OCR
alleging a school’s lack of vigilance in addressing sexual harassment readily
triggered an extended and costly OCR investigation of the institution.66 By
2016, the average investigation lasted 963 days.67 The OCR published
systematic lists of those schools under investigation.68 Many of these OCR
investigations ended with consent decrees requiring schools to adopt tactics of
questionable legality in the ongoing crusade to redress alleged sexual harassment
on campus.69 The OCR’s Sword of Damocles in pressuring the school’s
compliance was the agency’s power to withdraw federal funding from an
educational institution.70 Furthermore, the DCL’s mandate for a campus Title
IX coordinator would ultimately spawn vast Title IX bureaucracies on many
campuses that frequently were headed by former OCR staff.71
B. The Educational Institution’s Responsive Title IX Adjudicatory Systems
Schools predictably responded by creating Title IX adjudicatory models
heavily slanted in favor of the Title IX complaining party and correspondingly
66. See Title IX Sexual Assault Investigation Tracker, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (updated to include all investigations and reporting 2014
through 2020). See also Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges
Than Most People Know, HUFFPOST (June 16, 2016, 4:49 p.m.), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_n_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d (noting the OCR
had approximately 315 investigations in process or scheduled to commence as of June 2016).
67. Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-uncomfortable-truth-aboutcampus-rape-policy/538974/.
68. Yoffe, supra note, 67.
69. See, e.g., Law Professors’ Open Letter, supra note 41, at 3; Katie Jo Baumgardner, Note,
Resisting Rulemaking, Challenging the Montana Settlement’s Title IX Sexual Harassment
Blueprint, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1813, 1817 (2016) (reviewing the consent decree with the
University of Montana requiring adoption of “sexual conduct of an unwelcome nature” as school’s
sexual harassment standard and OCR contention that the adopted language was a “blue print” for
universities generally).
70. See Yoffe, supra note 67. See also Nancy Gertner, Sex Lies and Justice, AM. PROSPECT,
Winter 2015, at 32, 34–35, https://prospect.org/justice/sex-lies-justice/ (noting OCR’s Assistant
Secretary’s warning to college administrators that the withdrawal of funding was not “an empty
threat”).
71. Gersen & Suk, supra note 12, at 904–05.
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increased the number of Title IX adjudications that culminated with a
determination of guilt.72 Inevitable conclusions of the accused’s responsibility
for sexual harassment quelled any notion of dispensations of justice.73
Numerous colleges adopted the OCR’s favored “single investigator model” as
the means for the ultimate determination of Title IX claims.74 Employment of
the single investigator model dispensed with considerations of conflict of
interest or impartiality of the judge inherent in the university’s Title IX
coordinator serving as both advisor to the complainant and the designated single
investigator.75 The single investigator model vested in one individual the power
to investigate the Title IX claim, prepare any findings of fact, and render an
ultimate verdict on the Title IX complaint.76
The system left the accused with no guarantees concerning the extent of notice
and hearing he would be afforded before issuance of a ruling that could result in
suspension or expulsion from the college. There would be no live hearing on
the claim. Thus, there would be no occasion for receiving testimony under oath
from either party. The absence of a hearing additionally dispensed with
testimony under oath, the presentation of defense witnesses, cross-examination
of witnesses supporting the Title IX claim, or confrontation of the Title IX
complainant.77 The single investigator would determine whether an actual
72. See JENNIFER C. BRACERAS, INDEP. WOMEN’S FORUM, TITLE IX, SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT, AND DUE PROCESS ON CAMPUS 1 (2020), http://www.iwf.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/Policy_Focus_Title_IX_Sexual_Misconduct_and_Due_Process_on_Campu
s.pdf (outlining universities’ adoption of specific practices that “stack the deck” against the Title
IX accused through deprivations of procedural rights. resulting in increased disciplinary rates).
73. See infra note 120–23 and accompanying text (summarizing the nature of injustices of
many collegiate Title IX proceedings in Brandeis University opinion of United of States District
Judge Dennis Saylor, issued in 2016).
74. LINDA M. WILLIAMS ET. AL., NAT’L INST. JUST., RESPONDING TO SEXUAL ASSAULT ON
CAMPUS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCOPE AND
CHALLENGES FOR INVESTIGATION AND ADJUDICATION 34 (2020), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/254671.pdf (2020 survey of over 900 higher education institutions reflecting
employment of various adjudicatory systems including panels, single investigator, or sole person
systems).
75. See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 70 (surveying Harvard’s Title IX judicial system in which
the Title IX Coordinator servers as the single investigator with the Title IX office additionally
serving as counselor to the complainant); Ilana Frier, Campus Sexual Assault and Due Process, 15
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 130 (2020) (noting many critics of the single investigator
deem the system as readily susceptible to human bias).
76. See Djuna Perkins, Behind the Headlines: An Insider’s Guide to Title IX and the Student
Discipline Process for Campus Sexual Assault, BOST. BAR J. (July 8, 2015), https://bostonbar
journal.com/2015/07/08/behind-the-headlines-an-insiders-guide-to-title-ix-and-the-studentdiscipline-process-for-campus-sexual-assaults/ (reviewing investigator report format as including
factual findings followed by application of school’s misconduct policy rules to the facts).
77. See Rachel Russell, Editorial, Single Investigator Model for Sexual Misconduct Threatens
Civil Liberties for All Students, REVIEW (Nov. 3, 2015), http://udreview.com/editorial-singleinvestigator-model-for-sexual-misconduct-threatens-civil-liberties-for-all-students; see also Law
Professors’ Open Letter, supra note 41, at 5 (observing the necessity of restoration of due process
rights in the collegiate Title IX systems with restoration of rights such as cross-examination,
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investigation would occur before the rendition of a judgment.78 The direction
and thoroughness of any investigation that did occur were determined by the
single investigator. Determining the accuser’s credibility could amount to
nothing more than an interview by a sympathetic Title IX coordinator serving as
an advisor to that party.79 The selection of individuals to be interviewed as
possessing knowledge relevant to the claim was discretionary. The single
investigator’s ultimate authority in shaping a narrative of events was symbolized
by the final report with a summation of facts, applicable prohibitions, and
ultimate declarations or recommendations to a committee as to the accused’s
guilt or innocence.80
There were numerous other troubling practices frequently arising in the
institutions’ Title IX adjudications.81 The accused male had no assurance of
finality when a single investigator or disciplinary panel issued a “not
responsible” verdict for the alleged sexual harassment.82 The accuser could
readily appeal the “not responsible” ruling to a collegiate appellate panel
requesting a reversal and rendition of guilt. Thus, an appellate reversal and
pronouncement of guilt could occur without a live hearing or any revelation of
new facts justifying the reversal.83 Moreover, a determination of the accused’s
responsibility on the Title IX claim could occur with the respondent never
having been provided a written complaint specifying the particular allegations
of sexual harassment or the specific incidents giving rise to the claim.84 The
accused had no guarantee of being allowed to review a collegiate investigator’s
report or view conclusions of fact contained in the report.85 Investigations and

assistance of counsel, and access to evidence); see generally Gertner, supra note 70 (observing the
specific deprivations of due process for accused students in Harvard’s single investigator model).
78. See Gertner, supra note 70.
79. Gertner, supra note 70.
80. See Perkins, supra note 76.
81. See Law Professors’ Open Letter, supra note 41, at 1–6 (outlining with specificity the
violations of free speech and deprivation of due process that characterized publicly funded
universities enforcement of the DCL).
82. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2018) (adjudicating investigator’s decision of
not responsible reversed on appeal to collegiate panel); Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason
Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612-13 (E.D. Va. 2016) (reviewing university disciplinary panel’s
decision of not responsible after a ten-hour evidentiary hearing reversed on appeal)
83. See, e.g., Baum, 903 F.3d at 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing district court dismissal of
John Doe case wherein university reversed and rendered verdict of guilt with Title IX accused
afforded no hearing, or occasion to call witnesses or cross examine).
84. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851, 854–55, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)
(university appeals panel affirming issuance of accused’s suspension when Title IX accused
provided letter with name of complainant, date and code sections allegedly violated, but containing
nothing describing factual basis of charges).
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2019) (reversing
district court’s 2017 dismissal of certain title IX claims and Section 1983 claim with the accused
initially provided no copy of the investigator’s report contained the factual findings).
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ultimate decisions on the Title IX charge were frequently made by personnel
with a decided bias against males.86
The severity of bias experienced by males in the Title IX proceedings was
epitomized by the factual allegations in two John Doe lawsuits against William
Patterson University and Yale. The schools’ receipt of Title IX complaints
resulted in the accused’s handcuffing and arrest with no preliminary attempts to
contact the males for response nor initiation of any in-depth investigation to
examine the validity of the claims.87 Many campus rulings are issued without
consideration of critical evidence such as emails, Facebook posts, and telephone
calls by the accuser or accused.88 The complainant was on occasion assisted by
numerous advisors, including coaching if required to testify.89 The accused was
furnished with one advisor.90
The factual settings accompanying the Title IX claims frequently contributed
further uncertainty to the validity of numerous claims. The accuser and accused
had commonly engaged in significant alcohol consumption.91 A recurring
scenario included the parties involved in a consensual sexual relationship

86. See, e.g., Doe v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 270 F. Supp. 3d 799, 822–25 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
(denying motion to dismiss Title IX selective enforcement claim when suspended student alleged
with sufficient particularity a university disciplinary system with heavy bias in favor of female
students alleging sexual harassment); Doe v. Brown Univ., 210 F. Supp. 3d 310, 342 (D.R.I. 2016)
(observing that pursuant to training received on Title IX adjudications, one panel member wholly
disregarded all post-encounter evidence in support of accused’s innocence). See also JOHNSON &
TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 168 (observing the inherent female bias among college administrators
in decisions on claims of sexual harassment).
87. Collick v. William Paterson Univ., No. 16-471, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160359, at *7–15
(D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2016), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 699 Fed. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2017);
First Amended Complaint at 13–15, Doe v. Yale Univ., No. 3:15-CV-01608 (D. Conn. May 18,
2016).
88. Bethany Corbin, Riding the Wave or Drowning?: An Analysis of Gender Bias and
Twombly/Iqbal In Title IX Accused Student Lawsuits, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2682 & n. 114
(2017) (citing numerous John Doe cases with allegations of Title IX verdicts of guilt in collegiate
proceedings with accuser denied preliminary review of the school’s investigator’s report, precluded
from presenting of documentary evidence in defense, and with no opportunity to cross-examine the
accuser).
89. Corbin, supra note 88, at 2682.
90. Corbin, supra note 88, at 2682.
91. See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578–79; Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 239 F. Supp. 3d
1048, 1061–62 (S.D. Ohio 2017), reconsideration granted in part, 323 F. Supp. 3d 962 (S.D. Ohio
2018); Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-cv-322, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161297, at *7–*10
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016); see also John P. Barry & Edna D. Guerrasio, TITLE IX REPORT, THE
ACCUSED (Prokauser’s Educ. Grp. ed., 2017) https://prfirmpwwwcdn0001.azureedge.net/
prfirmstgacctpwwwcdncont0001/uploads/060e65822b0ffc23c6e036dc63e6c757.pdf (surveying
130 Title IX lawsuits with alcohol consumption or use of drugs present in 56.9% of the cases);
Yoffe, supra note 67 (surveying many that work with campus sexual assault describing sexual
harassment charge frequently arising from a “consensual sexual encounter, well lubricated by
alcohol, and end up with divergent views of what happened”).
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preceding the alleged incident, with the relationship in some instances having
continued after the alleged sexual assault.92
III. THE JOHN DOE LAWSUITS, JUDICIAL RESPONSE, & THE 2017 REVOCATION
OF THE 2011 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER
A. The Predominance of Judicial Restraint & Deference to the Universities
Title VII Disciplinary Systems (2012–2017)
The initial wave of John Doe lawsuits commenced in 2012, responding to the
suspensions and expulsions issued as penalties attendant to findings of guilt in
the Title IX campus proceedings.93 The most frequently employed claims,
separately or in tandem, were Title IX reverse gender-discrimination and Section
1983 actions premised upon deprivations of due process.94 An array of
alternative state law claims and requested equitable relief were frequently
included in the John Doe complaints.95 The judiciary had historically afforded
colleges and universities tremendous discretion in structuring and executing
campus disciplinary proceedings.96 The general doctrine of academic deference
was historically premised upon the judicial perception that America’s
educational institutions were largely cloistered from a capitalist system’s more
sinister temptations. Universities were pursuing a noble calling in their
dedication to educating America’s youth.97 This academic deference doctrine
encompassed numerous spheres of collegiate decision-making immune from
judicial oversight.98
92. See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 281 F. Supp. 3d 754, 759 (N.D. Ind. 2017), rev’d and
remanded, 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019).
93. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text for use herein of the term “John Doe
lawsuits”; see generally Title IX Legal Database, supra note 7; FIRE, supra note 7.
94. See Samantha Harris & K.C. Johnson, Campus Courts in Court: The Rise in Judicial
Involvement in Campus Sexual Misconduct Adjudications, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 49,
68 (2019); see generally Title IX Legal Database, supra note 7; FIRE, supra note 7. Section 1983
is a claim for state or local government actions under color of law in violation of the Constitution.
42 U.S.C § 1983 (2018).
95. See Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, at 68–69.
96. Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, at 107 (referencing “the deference that once was routine
for all campus disciplinary decisions, even if some procedural problems beset the college
adjudication”). See generally William E. Thro, No Angels in Academe: Ending the Constitutional
Deference to Public Higher Education, 5 BELMONT L. REV. 27 (2018).
97. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)
(“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent
value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.”).
98. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Fisher v. University of Texas: Who Put the Holes in
“Holistic”?, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 31–32 (2013) (tracing the historical judicial
deference to universities’ decisions on affirmative action and admissions); Scott A. Moss, Against
“Academic Deference”: How Recent Developments in Employment Discrimination Law Undercut
an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5–6 (2006) (tracing historical
academic deference in hiring and promotion decisions of educational institutions).
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The judiciary’s traditionally benign neglect in scrutinizing the academe
prevailed in the 2015–17 adjudications of the John Doe lawsuits.99 Despite the
potential penalties of suspension or expulsion and the stigma of sexual
misconduct, most courts did not view Title IX disciplinary proceedings as quasicriminal proceedings.100
1. The Frequent Summary Dismissals of Plaintiffs’ Title IX Discrimination
Claims Through Catch-22 Pleading Requirements
Scores of the John Doe, Title IX, reverse gender discrimination claims failed
to survive the pleading stage, with the frequent granting of the educational
institutions’ motions for dismissal based on failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.101 These courts adopted a test for the sufficiency of a
Title IX claim, specifically requiring factual allegations constituting a prima
facie case of a Title IX violation.102 This rigorous test left the plaintiff in a
“catch-22 position,” as the specific facts supporting Title IX discrimination are
primarily found in the lawsuit’s discovery phase.103 In contrast, a distinct
minority of federal courts adopted a less rigorous Title IX pleading standard
requiring only a plausible inference of gender discrimination arising from the
factual allegations.104 This relaxed pleading standard allowed for further
evidence of bias to be found in the course of discovery.
Most federal courts employed a second, equally imposing obstacle for the
John Doe plaintiffs in responding to the universities’ inevitable Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. Courts repeatedly dismissed Title IX claims by concluding the John

99. See Emily D. Safko, Note, Are Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: The Need for
Judicial Review and Additional Due Process Protections in Light of New Case Law, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2289, 2305–10 (2016) (surveying John Doe lawsuits and concluding predominant
reluctance of courts to intervene and redress abuses in the Title IX proceedings).
100. See, e.g., Marshall v. Ind. Univ., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1209 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (“A
disciplinary hearing in an educational setting is neither a criminal or quasi-criminal hearing. . . . As
such, the rights afforded to criminal defendants in a criminal trial do not apply.”); accord Doe v.
Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x. 437, 451 (6th Cir. 2016) (observing the due process afforded accused
in disciplinary proceeding need not be equivalent to that afforded the defendant in a criminal
proceeding).
101. See Corbin, supra note 88, at 2665, 2697 & n. 221 (providing results of 2017 survey of
federal district court cases confirming the clear majority of Title IX reverse discrimination claims
were dismissed at the pleading stage); see generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
102. Corbin, supra note 88, at 2669–70.
103. Corbin, supra note 88, at 2695.
104. See Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 186–90 (D.R.I. 2016); Doe v. Salisbury
Univ., 12 F. Supp. 3d 748, 768 (D. Md. 2015); see also Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv00052, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102426, at *1, 20–29 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015) (denying Rule
12(b)(6) motion finding plausible pleading of Title IX reverse discrimination with allegations of
federal pressure brought to bear on university regarding Title IX enforcement, as supported by
statements by university personnel regarding and circumstantial evidence that could be interpreted
as university representatives reflecting gender bias in proceeding).
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Doe factual pleadings of acts, statements, or statistics offered in support of Title
IX gender bias merely reflected a “pro-victim” bias.105 This “pro-accuser bias”
vs. “gender bias” distinction resulted in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a Title IX
reverse discrimination claim that included factual allegations recounting the
university president’s public statement expressing sympathy for the survivor of
sexual assault prior to any investigation or adjudication of the claim against the
accused males.106 The pro-victim bias served as one district court’s rationale for
granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions despite the plaintiff’s inclusion of statistics
reflecting a university’s finding of guilt on every Title IX claim filed against a
male student on campus.107 Given the daunting Title IX pleading requirements,
the male plaintiff found guilty in the collegiate proceeding could allege specific
instances of erroneous conduct by a disciplinary panel but have his Title IX
claim summarily dismissed based on a failure to plead facts demonstrating
wrongdoing was “caused” by gender discrimination.108
2. The Initial Reluctance of Courts to Recognize Significant Due Process
Rights for the Accused in the Campus Investigations and Adjudications
In the initial years of the John Doe lawsuit filings, the great majority of federal
district courts were similarly unwilling to find the accused in the campus Title
IX proceeding vested with extensive constitutional procedural due process
rights. The constitutional sufficiency of “notice and hearing” afforded is
“flexible” in nature.109 Specifically, the procedural due process owing one
threatened with a governmental taking of a property or a liberty interest is
determined by applying a three-factor test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge.110
105. See Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, at 93–94 & nn. 293-300 (citing Sahm v. Miami
Univ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (recognized as a high point of the pro-victim bias
theory with over 30 decisions subsequently following the reasoning of Sahm through 2019)).
106. See Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1224, 1232 (D. Or. 2016) (granting
Rule 12(b)(6) motion of complaint recounting university president’s depiction of the accuser as a
“survivor” and observing that, as a father, he was appalled at the alleged conduct), aff’d, 925 F.3d
1133 (9th Cir. 2019).
107. Doe v. Oberlin Coll., No. 1:17 CV 1335, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55703, at *16, *18 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 31, 2019) (pleading 100 percent of respondents were found guilty on at least one count
of Title IX harassment), rev’d and remanded, 963 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2020).
108. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 173 F. Supp. 3d 586, 603 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (refusing
to allow accused to cross-examine or be represented by counsel at disciplinary hearing failed to
show such was attributable to gender discrimination and claim dismissed); Johnson v. W. State
Colo. Univ., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1226 (D. Colo. 2014) (allegation that disciplinary conduct
undertaken by female panel members was allegedly taken against male, but not against female who
engaged in same conduct dismissed as not showing such disparity was attributable to gender
discrimination).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting the
extent of notice and hearing to be afforded varies from case to case based upon a three-factor
analysis).
110. Mathews, 424 U.S at 335. The three-factor test used in determining the extent of the
“notice” and “hearing” to be afforded is the following:
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Courts frequently prefaced their analysis of John Doe Section 1983 claims
with proclamations that the collegiate tribunals were not courts of law and Title
IX proceedings were not quasi-criminal.111 Accordingly, the Title IX accused
was guaranteed minimal rights bearing no relationship to due process guaranteed
a criminal defendant.112 Judicial decisions readily concluded that the common
collegiate practices, including denial of a live hearing on the claim, denial of
cross-examination or the calling of witnesses, and denial of confrontation of
one’s accuser, did not constitute violations of due process for the Title IX
respondent.113 Neither did a violation of due process occur when a verdict of
guilt rested on hearsay evidence, with the victim impact statements admitted into
evidence before any determination of guilt or innocence on the Title IX claim.114
B. Initial Signs of Judicial Awareness of Bias and Deprivations of Due Process
in the Title IX Disciplinary Proceedings
During 2015 through 2017, a cadre of federal and state courts perceived the
Title IX campus adjudications as matters of grave concern. This judicial
minority recognized that Title IX determinations were of far greater
consequence than decisions on allegations of academic misconduct. Decisions
on John Doe claims forthcoming from this minority of courts viewed the campus
Title IX proceedings as quasi-criminal given the life-altering consequences for
the accused adjudged a sexual assailant.115 The judicial oversight exercised by
this minority resulted in declarations of violation of substantive or procedural
due process when presented with common practices of Title IX tribunals that
disadvantaged the accused male. These practices included a de facto shifting of
the burden of proof requiring the Title IX respondent to disprove the Title IX

[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
111. See Marshall v. Ind. Univ., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1209 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
112. Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x at 446–49 (6th Cir. 2016) (observing the Title IX
hearing need not constitute a full-scale adversarial hearing, and due process analysis should not
focus on whether the accused be afforded the constitutional rights guaranteed in a criminal trial).
113. See Doe v. Baum, 227 F. Supp. 3d 784, 797–98 (E.D. Mich. 2017), rev’d, 903 F.3d 575
(6th Cir. 2018).
114. Cummins, 662 Fed. App’x at 447–48.
115. Cf. Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL, 2015 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 23139, at *1–2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2015) (reversing disciplinary panels finding
of guilt on basis of deprivation of rights associated with criminal proceedings).
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claim116 and the de novo appellate reversal and rendition of a guilty verdict on
the Title IX claim.117
Some of these courts were careful to limit their findings of due process
violations to the facts presented in the case.118 In contrast, other courts’ rulings
implicitly constructed a framework of constitutional due process rights readily
applicable to the accused in all Title IX proceedings. The latter courts’
expansive decisions collectively recognized the Title IX respondent’s
fundamental rights to include: (i) written notice of the complainant’s charge and
the alleged events made the basis of the claim; (ii) the opportunity to review the
evidence before any hearing on the complaint; (iii) the retention of legal counsel
in defense of the claim; and (iv) a live hearing on the Title IX charges with the
occasion to cross-examine, confront and examine one’s accuser, call defense
witnesses and introduce other evidence.119
Ironically, the most detailed articulation of rights to be afforded the Title IX
accused came from a federal district court decision describing the elements of
“basic fairness” in a private university’s adjudication of a sexual harassment
claim.120 Federal District Judge F. Dennis Saylor, in Doe v. Brandeis University,
partially denied the school’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the case.121 The
89-page opinion initially identified the governmental policies underlying the
continuing inequities:
In recent years, universities across the United States have adopted
procedural and substantive policies intended to make it easier for
116. Memorandum and Order at 23, Mock v. Univ. of Tenn. at Chattanooga, No. 14-1687-II
(Tenn. Ch. Ct. Aug. 4, 2015) (reversing disciplinary tribunal’s conclusion of guilt on court’s finding
of due process violation in effectively requiring the accused bear the burden of proof to disprove
the claim of rape).
117. See Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 622 (E.D. Va.
2016).
118. Id. at 622–23 (emphasizing the procedural narrowness of the ruling and disclaiming any
declaration of a particular form of notice that must always be given by all public universities).
119. Memorandum and Order, supra note 116, at 23 (reversing disciplinary tribunal’s
conclusion of guilt on court’s finding of due process violation in effectively requiring the accused
bear the burden of proof to disprove the claim of rape); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2015 Cal.
Super. LEXIS 23139, at *1–2 (utilizing a criminal proceeding paradigm in reversing the
university’s tribunals finding of guilt on Title IX claim, citing multiple due process violations such
as denial of the right to confront or cross examine the accuser, not recognition of Doe’s right to
invoke the right against self-incrimination and ordering a withdrawal of all findings and penalties
against the male); Neal v. Colo. State Univ. Pueblo, No. 16-cv-873-RM-CBS, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22196, at *62 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2017) (Federal magistrate finding numerous due process
violations in university Title IX proceeding including “[l]ack of formal or evidentiary hearing,
including the right to (i) question Plaintiff’s accuser (the Complainant), (ii) question the other
persons who [the Title IX coordinator] had interviewed, and (iii) present evidence and witnesses in
support of Plaintiff’s defense.”).
120. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561, 601 (D. Mass. 2016). The sexual harassment
claims in Brandeis occurred in the context of a Title IX campus proceeding with a male complainant
and male respondent. Id. at 569.
121. Id. at 617–18.
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victims of sexual assault to make and prove their claims and for the
schools to adopt punitive measures in response. That process has been
substantially spurred by the Office for Civil Rights of the Department
of Education, which issued a “Dear Colleague” letter in 2011
demanding that universities do so or face a loss of federal funding.
[citation omitted]. The goal of reducing sexual assault, and providing
appropriate discipline for offenders, is certainly laudable. Whether the
elimination of basic procedural protections—and the substantially
increased risk that innocent students will be punished—is a fair price
to achieve that goal is another question altogether.122
Thereafter, the opinion proceeded to call for a return to Title IX adjudications
characterized by sole consideration of the individuals before the collegiate
tribunal and ultimate determinations of guilt or innocence premised upon
impartial factual findings as to the validity of the claim.123 Such a model of
legitimate adjudications was contrasted with the developing trend of Title IX
collegiate proceedings conducted with predetermined outcomes:
If a college student is to be marked for life as a sexual predator, it is
reasonable to require that he be provided a fair opportunity to defend
himself and an impartial arbiter to make that decision. Put simply, a
fair determination of the facts requires a fair process, not tilted to favor
an outcome, and a fair and neutral fact-finder not predisposed to reach
a particular conclusion.124
C. The Department of Education’s Revocation of the 2011 Dear Colleague
Letter and Issuance of Interim Guidelines
On September 22, 2017, Secretary of Education DeVos announced the Dear
Colleague Letter’s (“DCL”) revocation with an accompanying issuance of
interim guidelines (“the Interim Guidelines”) for educational institutions’
adjudication of sexual assault claims.125 The Interim Guidelines were issued in
the format of “Q&A on Campus Sexual Misconduct”126 in a September 7th
speech. Secretary DeVos had provided notice of the imminent issuance of the
Interim Guidelines and revocation of the DCL, articulating the following
justification for ending the injustices of the DCL in the following terms:

122. Id. at 572.
123. Id. at 573.
124. Id. See also The New Title IX Rules, Off. Student Affs., Coll. of N.J., https://titleix.tcnj.
edu/policy-procedures/new-tix-regulations/ (reflecting the original 60 day period for public
comment on the Final Rule was twice extended and ultimately concluded on Feb. 25, 2020).
125. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OCR, Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, at 1, 2 (2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-201709.pdf?utm_content=&
utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_term= [hereinafter INTERIM
GUIDELINES].
126. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125.

Winter 2022]

Will Due Process Be Returned to Academic Suspension?

131

[L]et me be clear at the outset: acts of sexual misconduct are
reprehensible, disgusting, and unacceptable. They are acts of
cowardice and personal weakness, often thinly disguised as strength
and power . . . One assault is one too many. One aggressive act of
harassment is one too many. One person denied due process is one
too many . . . There is no way to avoid the devastating reality of
campus sexual misconduct: lives have been lost. Lives of victims.
And lives of the accused . . . We need to remember that we’re not just
talking about faceless “cases.” We are talking about people’s lives.
Everything we do must recognize this before anything else. . . [T]he
truth is that the system established by the prior administration has
failed too many students. Survivors, victims of a lack of due process
and campus administrators have all told me that the current approach
does a disservice to everyone involved.127
The Interim Guidelines offered great discretion to the universities in
voluntarily crafting their existing adjudicatory systems to afford greater due
process rights to the accused and equal treatment of the parties.128 The most
significant change brought by the Interim Guidelines was the elimination of the
DCL’s mandatory preponderance of the evidence standard, thereby permitting
substitution of the higher standard of proof of “clear and convincing
evidence.”129 Other areas where the Interim Guidelines opened the door for
schools to pursue equality of treatment for the parties to the sexual harassment
adjudications includes: (i) eliminating the DCL’s discouragement of crossexamination; (ii) inclusion of a mandatory provision for a hearing examination
of witnesses, including a right of the accused or panel to cross-examine the
accuser if the case rested on credibility; (iii) the elimination of the DCL’s
proposed time frames for resolving sexual harassment claims on campus; and
(iv) a rejection of the DCL’s opposition to employing voluntary mediation and
related voluntary resolution methods.130
127. Susan Svrluga, Transcript: Betsy DeVos’s Remarks on Campus Sexual Assault, WASH.
POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/
transcript-betsy-devoss-remarks-on-campus-sexual-assault/ [hereinafter DeVos Prepared
Remarks].
128. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125, at 3–5; Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld,
L.L.P, Title IX Litigation Alert (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/
60603/aoiUY/title-ix-the-department-of-education-issues-new-guidance-for-tit.pdf. Akin Gump
made the following observations concerning the INTERIM GUIDELINES:
[i]n light of the 2017 interim guidance, colleges and universities should examine their
existing Title IX policies and procedures to ensure that they do not afford rights or
opportunities to complainants that are not available to respondents . . . Colleges and
universities now have more flexibility in key aspects of their Title IX procedures such as
the applicable standard of proof, the timing of complaint resolution, and the potential for
increased use of informal resolution methods in cases of sexual assault.
Id.
129. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125 at 5.
130. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note125, at 3–5.
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The Interim Guidelines also lessened the defined circumstances giving rise to
the school’s affirmative obligation to respond to sexual harassment. The
redefining of the triggering event(s) for a response to sexual harassment tracked
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement: “when sexual misconduct is so severe,
persistent, or pervasive as to deny or limit a student’s ability to participate in or
benefit from the school’s programs or activities, a hostile environment exists,
and the school must respond.”131 The Department of Education simultaneously
announced that proposed permanent regulations to replace the Interim
Guidelines would be issued for public comment in compliance with the APA’s
public notice requirement.132 The Secretary specifically announced, “[t]he era
of rule by letter is over . . . Our interest is in exploring all alternatives that would
help schools meet their Title IX obligations and protect all students.”133
The Interim Guidelines’ general tenor was directed at ensuring that parties to
the sexual harassment adjudications be afforded the same rights in the
investigatory and adjudicatory phases.134 In responding to the Interim
Guidelines on behalf of multiple universities, the American Council on
Education made clear that schools would not make fundamental changes to the
existing modus operandi in campus investigations and adjudications of sexual
harassment claims.135 The schools’ decisions to continue with the existing
sexual harassment justice systems was an unfortunate sign that the frequent
predetermined outcomes and deprivations of procedural rights were not wholly
attributable to OCR pressure exerted in compelling DCL compliance. Rather,
the schools were to manifest a continuing devotion to the DCL’s vision of moral
consequentialism in which sexual harassment on campus was deterred by
visiting injustice on the accused.

131. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125, at 1 & n.3 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 631).
132. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125, at 1.
133. DeVos Prepared Remarks, supra note 127.
134. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125, at 2 ( “In regulating the conduct of students and
faculty to prevent or redress discrimination, schools must formulate, interpret, and apply their rules
in a manner that respects the legal rights of students and faculty, including those court precedents
interpreting the concept of free speech.”); DeVos Prepared Remarks, supra note 127.
135. PETER MCDONOUGH & SARAH SPREITZER, U.S. Department Education Office for Civil
Rights Withdraws 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, Confirms Intention to Issue New Title IX
Regulations, and Issues Interim Guidance in the Form of a Q&A, 5 (Am. Council on Educ. ed.,
2017) https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Issue-Brief-Title-IX-QA-2017.pdf. The American
Council on Education, representing approximately 1700 universities, stated:
In the short run, not much is likely to happen to how institutions handle campus sexual
assault cases. Our country’s colleges and universities have given intense and sustained
attention to sexual misconduct on their campuses. No institution will back off its
commitment to preventing sexual harassment and assault from occurring in the first
place, and to handling cases that do occur with compassion for the survivor and fairness
to both parties.
Id.

Winter 2022]

Will Due Process Be Returned to Academic Suspension?

133

D. The Decided Increase in Judicial Intervention to Redress the Injustices of
the Campus Tribunals (2018-2020)
1. Increased Judicial Intervention to Redress the Injustices of the Collegiate
Sexual Harassment Adjudications
The period of 2018 through 2020 witnessed a dramatic increase of judicial
intervention redressing injustices in universities’ Title IX proceedings. This
judicial assumption of heightened oversight as to the legality of the Title IX
proceedings was attributable to a series of federal circuit courts of appeals
decisions reviewing and reversing district courts’ summary dismissals of John
Doe Title IX and Section 1983 claims for deprivations of due process.136
2. The Judiciary’s Easing of the Standard for Plausible Pleading of
Plaintiffs’ Title IX Reverse Discrimination Claims
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2018 decision in Doe v. Miami
University137 was a landmark case in easing the rigorous pleading requirements
of Title IX reverse discrimination that had resulted in systematic Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissals of John Doe claims.138
Understanding the significance of the Miami University decision requires
considering classifications of factual pleadings historically employed in John
Doe lawsuits to establish gender bias and causation of an erroneous outcome
caused by gender bias. Among the primary categories of factual pleadings
offered in support of John Doe reverse discrimination claims are the following:
i.
The institution discriminated against accused males by
modifying and/or adopting adjudicatory systems that were
gender-biased or applied the systems in a gender-biased
manner as a response to pressure exerted by the federal
government;139
ii.
Statements by university officials that overtly reflected
gender bias or gave rise to a reasonable inference of gender
bias in the handling of the sexual misconduct claims against
males;140

136. See generally infra notes 186–206 and accompanying text.
137. Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 604–05 (6th Cir. 2018).
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see supra Section III.A.(1) (reviewing the stringent Title IX
pleading standard employed by courts in the initial years of the John Doe lawsuits).
139. Eric Rosenberg, Title IX Claims and Representing the Accused, ROSENBERG & BALL 1–
2, 11 (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.rosenbergball.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Eric-Rosen
bergs-Title-IX-Paper-for-2017-CLE.pdf.
140. Id. at 11, 13, 24.
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iii.

Statistical patterns arising from investigation and
adjudication of sexual misconduct claims giving rise to an
inference of gender bias against accused males;141
iv.
Evidence of adoption of gender-biased conduct by employees
in the course of the disciplinary proceeding;142
v.
The university’s disregard of its own designated procedures
in the course of the disciplinary hearing; and 143
vi.
Language adopted by the university reflecting gender-based
bias.144
Substantial discretion is vested in federal judges in determining the
sufficiency of the factual assertions of Title IX gender discrimination in rulings
on the universities’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Thus, during the initial years of the
John Doe lawsuits, the majority of federal judges exercised this substantial
discretion in repeatedly concluding that no plausible pleading of reverse
discrimination was established by complaints pleading factual allegations of
discrimination falling within these categories.145 For example, courts would
frequently refuse to draw the inference of gender bias or causation of an
erroneous outcome in the disciplinary proceeding from factual allegations
falling in such categories.146
The Miami University decision lessened the burden of plausibly pleading
reverse discrimination in its willingness to draw inferences of gender
discrimination and erroneous outcomes attributable to gender bias from factual
pleadings instead of speculating on alternative non-gender based inferences
from the factual pleadings. The court readily inferred that the plaintiff had
sufficiently pled a reverse gender discrimination claim with the following factual
allegations: (i) assertions that a series of procedural defects during the
university’s investigation and hearing on the claim hindered the plaintiff’s
ability to mount a defense; (ii) the pressure exerted by the OCR on the university
to more vigorously redress sexual misconduct; and (iii) statistical evidence that
141. Id. at 18–19.
142. Id. at 11, 13–14, 21.
143. Id. at 11–14, 21.
144. Id. at 12.
145. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (reviewing cases in which courts did not
infer gender bias from the factual allegations, but rather interpreted such factual pleadings against
the John Doe plaintiff).
146. See supra notes 105-07 (reviewing federal district court’s employment of the pro-victim
bias in analyzing the sufficiency of Title IX reverse discrimination claims).
Four distinct claims of Title IX reverse discrimination had developed, and the Miami decision
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of two of these Title IX claims. See Doe v. Miami Univ.,
882 F.3d 579, 589–92 (6th Cir. 2018). The most successful of the four categories of Title IX claim
asserted in John Doe complaints is the “erroneous outcome” theory in which it is contended that
gender-discrimination caused an erroneous outcome in the Title IX disciplinary proceeding. See
id. at 592–94. The Miami University decision reversed the district court’s dismissal of the Title IX
claim in finding sufficient pleading of facts supporting the causation element. Id.
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during the period 2011-2014, ninety percent of all sexual misconduct claims
where the party was found responsible were against individuals with male first
names.147 The court also rejected the long trend of undermining the factual
sufficiency of Title IX pleadings by characterizing claims of gender bias as mere
victim bias.148 The Sixth Circuit did not adopt the Second Circuit’s “minimal
plausible inference test.” Still, it departed from the prevailing rigid standard in
finding inferences of gender bias from an expanded field of factual pleadings
deemed sufficient to support the plaintiff’s claim.149
In their applications of the pleading analysis of Miami University, federal
district courts in the Sixth Circuit more readily found a plausible pleading of
reverse discrimination in the John Doe lawsuits.150 The Sixth Circuit, in
subsequent decisions, reaffirmed Miami University’s easing of the burden for
the pleading of Title IX reverse discrimination in John Doe complaints.151 The
Sixth Circuit’s 2020 decision in Doe v. Oberlin College reversed the district
court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a Title IX erroneous outcome claim.152
Specifically, the court found a viable claim of gender discrimination was present
when the complaint included allegations of (i) the school’s failure to follow their
own deadlines in carrying out the disciplinary hearing; (ii) procedural
147. Id. (observing additionally that during the 2013 fall semester and 2014 spring semester
one hundred percent of males charged were found responsible for sexual misconduct).
148. Id. at 593–94. See supra notes 105-07 (reviewing employment by federal district courts
of the pro-victim bias inference).
149. See id. at 588–89 (foregoing adoption of Second Circuit standard requiring a viable
pleading of gender discrimination to only allege “specific facts that support a minimal plausible
inference” of gender bias). Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 55–56 (2d Cir. 2016). Admittedly,
the Second Circuit’s Columbia standard for pleading the Title IX case is ostensibly a more forgiving
standard than that articulated in the Miami University decision. However, as between the two
standards, the determination of the plausibility of the Title IX claim remains highly fact intensive
and largely dependent on factors beyond merely whether the Columbia or Miami University
standard is applied. See Rosenberg, supra notes 139-44 (articulating, as counsel who successfully
argued plausibility in Miami University, various cases and pleading considerations in plausibly
pleading the reverse discrimination claim and responding to a motion for summary judgment). The
likelihood of the Title IX claim surviving the pleading stage is dependent on the ability of the
plaintiff’s counsel in drafting a complaint that persuasively weaves the given facts into a portrait of
plausible gender bias coupled with the great discretion vested in the federal district judge in the
relative weight to afford factual pleadings of gender bias.
150. See, e.g., Gischel v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:17-cv-475, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230847,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2018); Schaumleffel v. Muskingum Univ., No. 2:17-cv-463, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 36350, at *49–50 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2018). Various federal district courts outside
the Sixth Circuit additionally were influenced and implicitly adopted the Miami standard in
evaluating the sufficiency of Title IX claims. See, e.g., Doe v. Marymount Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d
573, 583–84 (E.D. Va. 2018).
151. See Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing district court’s
dismissal of Title IX claim and affirming a plausible Title IX erroneous outcome claim when
allegations of John Doe’s denial of cross-examination, rejection of testimony by all male witnesses
and finding credibility of all female witnesses in the disciplinary proceeding, and pressure exerted
on the university by an OCR investigation into the school’s handling of sexual harassment claims).
152. Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 586–88 (6th Cir. 2020).
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irregularities, including the disciplinary panel’s failure to even comment on the
wholly contradictory testimony of the female accuser; (iii) a verdict of guilt
unsupported by evidence; and (iv) the pressure exerted on Oberlin by an OCR
investigation of the College’s sexual harassment practices.153
Between June 2019 and September 2020, four federal circuits issued decisions
that reflected the adoption of Miami University’s Title IX pleading standard.154
These circuit court decisions expanded the range of factual allegations deemed
sufficient to plead gender bias plausibly. Each of the appellate decisions resulted
in the reversal of a federal district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a John Doe
Title IX claim against an educational institution. The circuit court cases
included the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Purdue University,155 the Third
Circuit’s decision in Doe v. University of Sciences,156 the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in Schwake v. Arizona Board of Regents,157 and the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in
Doe v. University of Arkansas – Fayetteville.158 Each of these four decisions
found sufficient factual pleading of the Title IX reverse discrimination claim
with a factual allegation of OCR pressure exerted on the institution when joined

153. Id. at 587.
154. See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text (reviewing series of Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions that have followed the Miami University decision in easing the standard for
pleading the plausible Title IX claim).
155. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668–70 (7th Cir. 2019) (alleging (i) the school was
threatened with a withdrawal of federal funding absent a showing of zealous pursuit of those
charged with sexual harassment; (ii) the accused was denied the opportunity by the panel to present
his defense witnesses at the hearing; (iii) the panel reached the verdict of guilt without having read
the investigator’s report and having received no sworn testimony from the accuser; (iv) the dean of
students and panel members on panel believed accuser without ever having personally heard her
accusations; and (v) university center published position that all sexual assault is a problem
attributable to men as a group).
156. Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2020) (alleging (i) the school had
abrogated the procedural rights of males in response to the DCL and federal officials’
encouragement; (ii) the school refused to investigate three female students for the same disciplinary
violation with which Doe was charged; and (iii) the disciplinary panel refused to consider Doe’s
defense of incapacity despite his substantial alcohol consumption at the time of the incident).
157. Schwake v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 948–51 (9th Cir. 2020) (alleging (i)
the school was pressured by an OCR investigation; (ii) the investigation of the claim was one-sided
as no consideration was given to Doe’s version of events and the investigator failed to interview
defense witness and evidence referred by Doe; and (iii) university officials involved in the
disciplinary proceeding violated rules of confidentiality and privilege by publicly discussing the
proceeding).
158. Doe v. Univ. of Ark. – Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 863–66 (8th Cir. 2020) (alleging (i) the
finding of guilt against Doe was against the substantial weight of the evidence; (ii) the committee’s
inexplicably light penalty upon a finding of sexual assault; (iii) the exertion of pressure on the
University, from multiple sources, including an OCR investigation and press reports, to redress
campus sexual assault; and (iv) inclusion on Doe’s educational record of a notation concerning a
disciplinary record for prior sexual assault).
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with a series of other factual allegations supporting an inference of gender
bias.159
The relaxing of Title IX pleading requirements forthcoming from the Miami
University decision and its appellate progeny in other circuits have not been
accepted in all quarters. The First and Tenth Circuits issued recent opinions
reflecting adherence to the more rigorous pleading requirements for Title IX
reverse discrimination claims previously representing the majority position
among federal district courts.160 Other federal appellate courts, such as the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, have yet to issue definitive
opinions on the standards to prevail in judging the plausible pleading of the Title
IX reverse discrimination claim.161
3. Judicial Recognition of Expanded Due Process Rights Owed to the
Accused in the Campus Title IX Proceedings
The two-year period also witnessed a widespread judicial departure from the
earlier majority position that concluded that the accused was owed only limited
due process rights in the collegiate adjudications.162 The recognition of extended
due process rights for the accused was the product of a series of federal circuit
court of appeals decisions.163 In some instances, the recognition of increased
due process rights came from the same federal appellate decisions that had eased
the pleading requirements on John Doe reverse discrimination claims.164 The
recognition of increased due process rights constitutionally guaranteed to the
accused was the product of a new judicial perception of the relative weight of
the accused’s “private interest[s],” the “risk of erroneous deprivation” of such
interest, and the schools’ burden to provide additional rights to the accused.165
The expansion of procedural rights encompassed both constitutional due process
rights in Title IX hearings at public universities and procedural rights

159. See supra notes 155-58 (including summations of the factual pleadings deemed to support
gender bias in each of the four appellate decisions).
160. See Doe v Univ. of Denver, 952 F.3d 1182, 1197 (10th Cir. 2020); Haidak v. Univ. of
Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 73–75 (1st Cir. 2019).
161. See Pet. For Cert., at 1, Rossley v. Drake Univ., 979 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1692 (2021) (petition for writ of certiorari identifying circuit court of appeals
decisions herein reviewed as reflecting the split on Title IX pleading requirements, but noting no
additional circuits’ decisions as implicated in this division denied on March 22, 2021).
162. See supra Section III.A.(2) (discussing the previous majority position in judicial decisions
considering the procedural due process rights due to the accused in the Title IX proceeding).
163. See supra Section III.D.(3) (reviewing the significant decisions recognizing expanded due
process rights for the Title IX accused during period of 2018 through 2020).
164. See, e.g., Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2019); Doe v. Baum, 903
F.3d 575, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2018).
165. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (reviewing the three-prong test of Mathews v.
Eldridge in determinations of constitutionally guaranteed procedural due process).
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contractually guaranteed the accused in sexual harassment adjudications at
private universities.166
The landmark 2018 decision in Doe v. Baum167 was a logical extension of the
accused’s right of cross-examination earlier articulated in Doe v. University of
Cincinnati.168 The Sixth Circuit decision in University of Cincinnati had
recognized the necessity of a live hearing, with an examination of the accuser,
if the Title IX panel’s ultimate determination turned on the accuser’s
credibility.169 The Cincinnati decision concluded that due process requirements
were met with the disciplinary panel conducting the accuser’s crossexamination.170 The Baum decision expanded the duty to test the accuser’s
credibility in concluding that due process included the right of the accused or his
agent to examine the Title IX complainant.171 The Baum decision reflected a
growing judicial recognition of a constitutionally mandated procedure directed
at ensuring Title IX determinations were premised upon legitimate findings of
fact. Federal district courts in the Sixth Circuit soon extrapolated the rationale
of Baum in expanding the accused’s right to examination of witnesses. More
specifically, these courts expanded the scope of the accused’s due process rights
to include cross-examination of all adverse witnesses in the Title IX adjudication
with accompanying “access to exculpatory evidence necessary to engage in
meaningful cross-examination.”172
Baum was equally significant in redressing two other inequities that regularly
characterized the Title IX proceedings. The court’s recognition of the right of
cross-examination in Title IX cases was, by implication, the death knell for
universities’ widespread employment of the single investigator model.173
Secondly, no longer would the Sixth Circuit tolerate a collegiate appellate panel
166. See infra notes 200–05 and accompanying text (reviewing the 2020 Third Circuit decision
recognizing the procedural rights of the Title IX accused in private university disciplinary
proceeding that were contractually created by university in student handbook’s representation of
fairness in disciplinary proceedings).
167. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
168. See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 400–07 (6th Cir. 2017) (recognizing a
violation of the accused’s due process rights in panel’s failure to conduct a hearing in which the
accuser’s credibility could be assessed).
169. Id. at 402–05.
170. Id. at 406–07.
171. Baum, 903 F.3d at 578, 583 (including the Court’s qualification that the right of the
accused to examine might not apply in all situations as the circumstances of some hearings might
require that only the accused’s agent conduct the examination).
172. See Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, at 75 & n. 160 (citing Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 311
F. Supp. 3d 881, 889–93 (S.D. Ohio 2018); Nokes v. Miami Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00482, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136880, at *37 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2017)).
173. See Baum, 903 F.3d at 580–86 (finding plausible claim of violations of due process in the
university appellate panel’s denial of hearing given recognized right of cross-examination of the
accused in Title IX proceedings implicating credibility). See generally LINDA M. WILLIAMS ET.
AL., supra note 74 (surveying university Title IX adjudicatory systems and concluding widespread
use of the single investigator model).
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engaging in de novo factual findings with reversals and renditions of guilt. The
accused was now entitled to a live hearing with witnesses.174
Other contemporaneous Sixth Circuit decisions had reaffirmed commonly
acknowledged rights for the accused, including: (i) determinations by an
impartial fact-finder,175 (ii) preliminary notice of the charges; (iii) specification
of the incident or incidents forming the basis of the Title IX complaint; and (iv)
a preliminary review of the evidence to be utilized in support of the claim.176 In
the Miami University decision, the Sixth Circuit had found a plausible claim for
deprivation of procedural due process in the bias manifested by a panel
member’s alleged statement during the hearing, “I’ll bet you do this [i.e.,
sexually assault women] all the time.”177
The most significant decision of the 2019–2020 period in articulating a
comprehensive framework of the Title IX accused’s procedural due process
rights was authored by then Judge Amy Coney Barrett in the Seventh Circuit’s
Doe v. Purdue University decision, issued in June 2019.178 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a Section 1983 claim for
deprivation of constitutional rights, and a Title IX reverse discrimination claim
asserted by a John Doe plaintiff.179 Judge Barrett commenced with a detailed
recounting of the alleged course of events that had culminated in the University’s
ultimate adjudication of guilt on the Title IX claim, resulting in the plaintiff’s
suspension, loss of a naval scholarship, and anticipated career in the Navy.180
The disciplinary panel portrayed in the Purdue decision epitomized some of the
more egregious adjudication practices emerging from various Title IX
proceedings during the DCL era. As a threshold matter Section 1983 claims
require the court to determine whether the plaintiff had incurred deprivation of
a property or liberty interest sufficient to trigger due process protections.181 The
court initially applied the “stigma-plus” test, which required reputational
damage from governmental action coupled with the loss of a legal right that the

174. See Baum, 903 F.3d at 581–82.
175. See, e.g., Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1071 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (quoting
Doe v. Brandeis Univ., 177 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mass. 2016), reconsideration granted in part, 323
F. Supp. 3d 962 (S.D. Ohio 2018)).
176. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2017) (“While the exact
outlines of process may vary, universities must ‘at least’ provide notice of the charges, an
explanation of the evidence against the student, and an opportunity to present his side of the story
before an unbiased decision maker.”).
177. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579, 601, 603 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding, however, no
violation of due process based on allegation withholding of the investigator’s file from the accused
in violation of the school’s policy).
178. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019).
179. Id. at 670.
180. Id. at 656–58.
181. Id. at 659.
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party had possessed before the reputational damage.182 The stigma-plus
requirement was fulfilled as Doe incurred damage beyond his label as one found
guilty of a sexual offense.183 Doe additionally incurred the loss of legal rights
through the University’s mandatory notification to the ROTC of the finding of
responsibility for the sexual offense.184 Specifically, the distinct legal rights
affected included loss of the scholarship and permanent expulsion from the
ROTC program.185
The court then reversed the district court’s dismissal of Doe’s Section 1983
claim, observing numerous plausible pleadings of due process violations in
Doe’s complaint.186 Initially, the court noted the pleading of a viable claim of
deprivation of due process with the allegation of Purdue having conducted a
“sham” disciplinary proceeding wherein two of the three Title IX panel members
had admittedly not read the investigator’s report.187 Thus, Purdue University
essentially contended that the finding of Doe’s guilt on the Title IX complaint
was premised solely on the Title IX complaint of accuser Jane Roe, without the
panel’s knowledge or reference to any other evidence.188 Additionally, Doe
alleged a viable claim for deprivation of due process as the University denied
him an opportunity for any preliminary review of the evidence to be used in
support of the claim.189
A separate plausible claim of denial of due process was presented with Doe’s
allegation that the University had wholly failed to test Jane Roe’s credibility as
the accuser.190 Roe’s testimony was the sole evidence supporting her claim that
she awoke, in Doe’s bed, to discover she was the victim of nonconsensual sexual
groping.191 The disciplinary panel did not require Roe to attend the hearing.192
Doe further alleged she was never questioned under oath, nor had the panel
members even interviewed Roe.193
182. Id. at 659–62 & n.2 (observing that the Seventh Circuit does not recognize a generalized
property interest in pursuit of a higher education whereas the First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
recognize education as a stand-alone property interest sufficient to trigger procedural due process).
See generally James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Application of Stigma-Plus Due Process Claims
to Education Context, 41 A.L.R.6th § 2 (2020) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972)) (defining stigma plus as the requirement that a procedural due process claim for
injury to reputation as cognizable only if joined with allegations of deprivation of anther liberty or
property interest by the government).
183. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 661–62.
184. Id. at 662.
185. Id. at 663.
186. Id. at 663–64.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 664.
189. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 659 (observing that Doe was denied the occasion to read the
investigative report or access any evidence relied upon by the panel).
190. Id. at 664.
191. Id. at 656–58.
192. Id. at 657–58.
193. Id. at 659.
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Doe clearly put Roe’s credibility in question with his denial of the alleged
groping.194 Doe’s allegations confirmed the depiction of a sham proceeding with
minimal attempts at providing him notice of the factual basis of the Title IX
charge, followed by complete denial of an opportunity to present a defense.195
The complaint included allegations that the panel refused to allow the testimony
of Doe’s roommate, who was present at the hearing.196 The roommate had been
in the room at the time of the alleged groping incident and would have refuted
Roe’s charge.197 In concluding a review of the litany of alleged denials of due
process, Judge Barrett found no need even to consider the panel’s refusal to
allow cross-examination of Roe.198
The Purdue decision exerted influence on federal circuit and district courts
outside the Seventh Circuit with its framework of clearly defined due process
rights to be afforded the accused in all Title IX collegiate proceedings.199
Finally, a significant array of procedural rights constitutionally guaranteed to
the accused in the Title IX public university proceeding were extended to the
private university in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ May 2020 decision in
Doe v. University of Sciences.200 The decision reversed the federal district
court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the John Doe complaint.201 The University of
Sciences opinion identified numerous plausible allegations of the school’s
violation of its contractual agreement with students to provide fair and equitable
disciplinary proceedings.202 Specifically, the University’s Student Handbook
represented that disciplinary proceedings would include identified procedures to
ensure the hearing was conducted in an ‘“adequate, reliable, impartial, prompt,
fair and equitable’” manner, with the further pledge to “‘[s]upport complainants
and respondents equally.’”203 The court interpreted the agreement for “fair and
equitable” treatment to minimally include a live, adversarial hearing with a right
to confront the Title IX accuser and cross-examine adverse witnesses.204 Thus,
Doe asserted a viable breach of contract claim in alleging the University denied
him such a hearing on the Title IX complaint.205 University of Sciences had
194. Id. at 657.
195. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 657–58.
196. Id. at 658, 664.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 664 & n.4.
199. See Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2020); Lee v. Univ. of N.M., 449 F.
Supp. 3d 1071, 1126–27 (D.N.M. 2020); Doe v. Univ. of Conn., No. 3:20cv92, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11170, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2020) (cases recognizing enhanced procedural rights for
the accused including most prominently a right of cross examination if credibility is in issue).
200. Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020) (recognizing the right of
examination for the accuser).
201. Id. at 205.
202. Id. at 215–16.
203. Id. at 206 (quoting student handbook of University of Sciences).
204. Id. at 215 (internal quotations omitted).
205. Id. at 216.
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additional significance in its release after the issuance of the 2020 Final Rule in
corroborating the principal procedural guarantees incorporated in the Rule.206
The recognition of increased due process rights for the accused was evident
even in the First Circuit’s decision in Haidak v. The University of
Massachusetts-Amherst.207 In Haidak, the Court ruled that the accused had no
personal right to cross-examine the Title IX complainant.208 However, the Court
qualified this holding, stating that if credibility was in issue, and the prospect of
severe penalties implicated in the proceeding, the disciplinary panel could not
forego any testing of the accuser’s credibility or merely presume the truthfulness
of the accuser’s allegations.209 The Haidak opinion acknowledged that a neutral
third party, including the disciplinary panel, could undertake the accuser’s
examination when credibility was an issue.210 However, by electing to
undertake the examination of the accused, the panel was obligated to conduct
the inquiry in a responsible manner.211 While not addressed by the Court, a
single investigator’s interview of the Title IX complainant, if consisting of the
complainant’s mere recounting of events, likely would not be constitutionally
sufficient given the requirement of testing the accuser’s credibility.212
Not every federal appellate decision in 2018–2020 continued expanding due
process rights for the accused in the Title IX proceedings.213 Some circuits, such
as the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, have not fully articulated the
206. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (noting May 2020 release date of Final Rule).
207. Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 933 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2019). See David Russcol,
First Circuit Decision in Haidak v. University of Massachusetts Includes Limited Progress for Due
Process at Public Universities, BOSTON LAWYER BLOG (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.bostonlawyerblog.com/first-circuit-decision-in-haidak-v-university-ofmassachusetts-includes-limited-progress-for-due-process-at-public-universities/ (describing the
First Circuit’s recognition of increased due process rights for the Title IX accused but distinguishing
Haidak from other federal circuits delineation of more extensive due process rights).
208. Haidak, 933 F.3d at 69.
209. Id. at 72–73. See Samantha Harris, In Flawed but Ultimately Helpful Ruling, First Circuit
Recognizes Limited Right to Cross-Examination in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, FIRE (Aug.
8, 2019), https://www.thefire.org/in-flawed-but-ultimately-helpful-ruling-first-circuit-recognizeslimited-right-to-cross-examination-in-campus-disciplinary-proceedings/
(critiquing
Haidak
favorably in the First Circuit’s recognition of examination of the accuser but noting the potential
problems with a panel as opposed to an advocate conducting the questioning).
210. Haidak, 933 F.3d at 69.
211. Id. at 70.
212. See id. at 72–73. See Russcol, supra note 207 (noting the legal hazards posed for
universities situated in the First Circuit in continuing with the single investigator model given the
Haidak requirement for testing the accuser’s credibility).
213. See Doe v. Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2020) (concluding no
due process violation where student was adequately notified of charges against him by the accuser
in her appeal of the Title IX decision at the university and concluding no shifting of the burden of
persuasion to the accused occurred). The Tenth Circuit in its University of Denver decision did not
engage in a substantive analysis of the rights to be afforded the Title IX accused in the private
school proceeding due to the plaintiff’s erroneous pleading of due process as applicable to a private
university. Doe v. Univ. of Denver, 952 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2020).
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precise due process rights owed the accused in the Title IX proceeding.214 In the
final analysis, with the ruling in Haidak, there is a significant trend recognizing
the accused’s right to a hearing, notice of the charges, and some form of
examination when credibility is in issue. The previous widespread practice of
allowing all claims to be resolved by a single investigator is rejected by some
courts or in other courts, severely restricted by the necessity of a hearing when
credibility is implicated in resolving the Title IX claim.215
E. The Universities’ Refusal to Pursue Voluntary Reform or Respond to the
Increasing Judicial Criticisms of the Collegiate Adjudicatory Systems
The DOE’s September 2017 revocation of the DCL and replacement with the
Interim Guidelines afforded the educational institutions an opportunity to reform
their adjudicatory systems.216 Three recent yearly FIRE Due Process Surveys
of fifty-three top academic institutions concluded with a 2019–2020 report.
FIRE’s surveys found little in the way of voluntary reform. Specifically, the
institutions failed to pursue changes calculated to further equal treatment for
parties to the Title IX proceeding or afford the accused greater procedural
rights.217 Particularly striking was the refusal of some institutions to implement
judicially ordered revisions to remedy the unlawful deprivation of due process
rights for the accused.218
As of October 2021 there have been over 700 lawsuits filed by students or
faculty contending that their rights were violated in Title IX investigations or
adjudications.219 In a review of 298 John Doe lawsuits against educational
institutions, as of August 2019, plaintiffs had received some form of judicial
relief in 151 cases.220 When measured yearly, the lawsuits were filed with

214. See Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, 68–77 (tracing the trend of federal circuit decisions
recognizing expanded due process rights in Title IX proceedings while cases addressing such rights
continue to work their way through other court systems).
215. See supra Section III.D.(3) (discussing the judicial recognition of expanded due process
rights for the Title IX accused including live hearings on the charge and live examination of parties
and witnesses).
216. See INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 125.
217. See Spotlight on Due Process, 2019–2020, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/resources/
spotlight/due-process-reports/due-process-report-2019-2020/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2021)
(surveying educational institutions’ general failure to provide the accused due process rights in
Title IX proceedings); Spotlight on Due Process 2018, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/resources/
spotlight/due-process-reports/due-process-report-2018/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2021); Spotlight on
Due Process 2017, FIRE, https://www.thefire.org/resources/spotlight/due-process-reports/dueprocess-report-2017/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
218. Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, at 111 (reporting the University of Michigan had
implemented no provision for a right of cross-examination in Title IX adjudications nearly one year
after the University of Cincinnati decision ruling and continued to largely leave decisions to a single
investigator after the Baum decision).
219. See Title IX Database, supra note 7; FIRE, supra note 7.
220. Harris & Johnson, supra note 94, at 66.
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increasing frequency through 2018.221 The filing of new lawsuits has continued
throughout 2020.222 There is good reason to believe that the courts’ growing
activism will not diminish in redressing denials of due process and gender
discrimination.223 Class action certifications have recently been sought on
behalf of males punished under the DCL regime.224
IV. PROPOSAL, PUBLIC COMMENT, & IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL RULE &
REVIEW OF ITS FRAMEWORK
A. The DOE’s Compliance with the APA as a Precedent to the 2020
Publication of the Final Rule & the Widespread Opposition of the Academic
Institutions
The DOE published its Proposed Final Rule for public comment on November
29, 2018.225 The unofficial version of the Proposed Final Rule, with all
accompanying documents, ran over 2033 pages.226 The Proposed Rule included
221. The frequency of the institution of John Doe lawsuits by year has been summarized as
follows: (seven filings 2011–2012); (seven filings 2013); (twenty-five filings 2014); (forty-five
filings 2015); (forty-seven filings 2016); (seventy-eight filings 2017); (seventy-eight filings in
2018). Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Title IX Lawsuits Have Skyrocketed in Recent Years, Analysis Shows,
HIGHER ED DIVE (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.highereddive.com/news/title-ix-lawsuits-haveskyrocketed-in-recent-years-analysis-shows/569881/. See also Andrew Kreighbaum, Title IX
Court Decisions Make It Harder for Biden to Rewrite Rules, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-05/devos-legacy-snags-biden-s-rewrite-ofcollege-male-bias-rules (observing fifty-nine John Doe lawsuits were filed in 2020).
222. Title IX Database, supra note 7.
223. The extent to which John Doe lawsuits will continue to be filed, based upon adjudications
occurring after the May 2020 implementation of the Final Rule, is primarily dependent on the extent
to which educational institutions forego efforts to circumvent the Final Rule so long as it remains
in force, conform to the constitutional procedural requirements of controlling case law, and avoid
the issuance of gender-based decisions.
224. See James Moore & Kursat Christoff Pekgoz, The Unfairer Sex, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec.
18, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2019/12/18/men-are-banding-together-classaction-lawsuits-against-discrimination-title-ix (highlighting pending lawsuits seeking class action
status).
225. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2018). See also Secretary Devos: Proposed Title
IX Rule Provides Clarity for Schools, Support for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Nov. 16, 2018, 09:41 AM), https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USED/
bulletins/21bcf5b.
226. The unofficial version of the Proposed Final Rule issued by DOE included a Fact Sheet,
a Final Rule overview, a document detailing the major provisions of the Final Rules, and a
document highlighting changes between the prior Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the Final
Rule Unofficial Version of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Title IX Regulations
IX,
Addressing
Sexual
Harassment
(Unofficial
Copy),
TITLE
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleix-regs-unofficial.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2021) [hereinafter the Unofficial Version]. The Proposed Final Rule, when published in the Federal
Register, encompassed 38 pages. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
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extensive accompanying annotations explaining the justifications and rationale
of the many regulations in the Final Rule.227 The DOE’s accompanying Fact
Sheet listed the following Guiding Principles in the process of drafting of the
Proposed Rule:
Rulemaking Process: It is important to address this issue through
notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than non-binding guidance.
The Department looks forward to the public’s comments, and has
benefitted from listening sessions and discussions with students,
schools, advocates, and experts with a variety of positions.
Greater Clarity: The proposed regulation seeks to ensure that schools
understand their legal obligations and that complainants and
respondents understand their options and rights.
Increased Control for Complainants: The Department recognizes that
every situation is unique and that individuals react to sexual
harassment differently. The proposed regulation seeks to ensure that
schools honor complainants’ wishes about how to respond to the
situation, including increased access to supportive measures.
Fair Process: The proposed regulation is grounded in core American
principles of due process and the rule of law. It seeks to produce more
reliable outcomes, thereby encouraging more students to turn to their
schools for support in the wake of sexual harassment and reducing the
risk of improperly punishing students.228
Opponents of the Rule, desiring to remain under the directives of the revoked
DCL, pursued a preplanned strategy of publishing a plethora of public comments
with DOE, repeatedly referencing the Rule’s purported unfairness and lack of
sensitivity to survivors.229 Accordingly, DOE received tens of thousands of
comments, characterized by harsh rhetoric and prophesying that the Final Rule
would usher in an open season for sexual assailants on campuses.230 Advocacy
groups clamoring for the DCL’s resurrection commenced preparations of

Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2018). The Department of
Education proceeded with the prescribed process for enactment of enforceable legislative rules in
accordance with the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
227. § 106.
228. U.S. Department of Education Proposed Title IX Regulation Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/proposed-title-ix-regulation-fact-sheet.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
229. See, e.g., The State of Title IX, KNOW YOUR IX, https://www.knowyourix.org/collegeresources/hands-off-ix/ (noting advocacy groups’ previous collection of 100,000 comments in
support of “survivors” and “fairness”) (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
230. See DEPT. OF EDUC., Rulemaking Docket Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
https://www.regulations.gov/docket/ED-2018-OCR-0064 (last visited Oct. 22, 2021) (including all
public comments on the Proposed Final Rule, many of which predict catastrophic consequences for
college women should the Final Rule be enacted).
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lawsuits to legally block the Final Rule when it was ultimately published as
Law.231
Analysis of the 124,196 public comments on the Proposed Final Rule revealed
vast numbers of educational institutions frequently registered blanket
condemnation of the proposed regulations.232 They were supplemented with
particularized critiques of specific provisions in the Final Rule. Consistent
objections were lodged to the following: (1) the mandatory live hearing on the
sexual harassment complaint with required attendance of the accuser and
accused; (2) guaranteed procedural rights for the accused, including the right to
confront the accuser at the hearing and a reciprocal right of the Title IX parties
to cross-examine through their designated advisors; and (3) assertions that DOE
had exercised its administrative powers arbitrarily and capriciously in
formulating the Final Rule’s comprehensive directives.233
B. Implementation of the Final Rule in May 2020 & Its Framework
On May 19, 2020, DOE published the Final Rule after DOE had briefly
extended the period for public comments.234 The lawsuits challenging the Final
Rule were expeditiously filed.235 Remarkably, the ACLU’s lawsuit, filed in
conjunction with 18 state attorney generals, challenged the Final Rule as
“arbitrary and capricious” despite DOE’s consideration of over 124,000 public
comments and inclusion of more than 2,000 pages of commentary explaining
the respective regulation.236 The Final Rule’s commentary reflected heavy
reliance upon judicial decisions articulating the need to incorporate due process
rights into the campus adjudicatory systems. Additionally, the Final Rule
included comprehensive explanations of DOE’s decision not to incorporate
various proposed changes in the public comments.237
231. Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Ed Dept’s Final Rules on Campus Sexual Assault Meet Opposition,
HIGHER ED DIVE (May 6, 2020, 06:54 PM), https://www.educationdive.com/news/title-ixregulations-released/566248 (observing the lawsuits planned to challenge the Title IX Final Rule
upon final enactment).
232. See, e.g., Elina Arbo, Columbia Joins National Coalitions of Universities Condemning
Newly-Proposed Title IX Regulations, COLUM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 4, 2019, 12:51 AM),
https://www.columbiaspectator.com/news/2019/02/04/columbia-joins-national-coalitions-ofuniversities-condemning-newly-proposed-title-ix-regulations/.
233. Id.
234. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education, 34 C.F.R. §106 (2020).
235. See Greta Anderson, Legal Challenges on Many Fronts, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 13,
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/07/13/understanding-lawsuits-against-newtitle-ix-regulations (reviewing existing and anticipated litigation seeking injunctive relief to block
implementation and declarations of invalidity of the Final Rule).
236. The ACLU’s Absurd Title IX Lawsuit, NAT’L REV. (May 19, 2020),
https://www/nationalreview.com/2020/05/the-aclus-absurd-title-ix-lawsuit (critiquing the ACLU’s
abandonment in the litigation pursuing preservation of due process rights and reverting to mere
rhetoric in equating the accuser with the victim).
237. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2020). See, e.g., DEPT. OF EDUC., Title IX Regulations
Addressing Sexual Harassment (Unofficial Copy), at 845-82, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices
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The Final Rule admittedly does not attain perfection in the realization of its
stated missions.238 It nevertheless remains the case that the Final Rule represents
a good faith effort to curb the continuation of collegiate justice systems of their
de facto presumption of the guilt of the accused. The Final Rule reflects
exhaustive research and in-depth analysis of the case law and literature,
revealing the many irregularities and injustices in the systems prompted by the
DCL.
This article does not exhaustively analyze every regulation included in the
Final Rule. A summation of the Final Rule’s structure is provided, commencing
with the definition of sexual harassment and the parameters of educational
institutions’ duties in responding to sexual harassment.
Thereafter,
classification of the Rule’s several sections governing filing a sexual harassment
claim, along with the investigation, adjudication, and ultimate determinations on
the complaint, are provided. The Final Rule is best characterized by the
specificity its sections offer in providing uniformity and order to the disciplinary
proceedings and affording equality of treatment to the parties.
1. Sexual Harassment Defined
Three categories of misconduct define sexual harassment:
1. Any instance of quid pro quo harassment by a school’s
employee;
2. any unwelcome conduct that a reasonable person would find
so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies
a person equal educational access;
3. any instance of sexual assault (as defined in the Cleary Act),
dating violence, domestic violence, or stalking as defined in
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).239
/list/ocr/docs/titleix-regs-unofficial.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2021) [hereinafter Regulations
Addressing Sexual Harassment] (providing the Department’s reasoning in adopting a presumption
of Non-Responsibility and responses to multiple public comments criticizing the presumption on
numerous grounds).
238. One of the more objective critics of the Final Rule has summarized:
They are not exactly as I would wish, but they clarify the rights of both victims and the
accused in a way that is likely to lead to improvements in basic fairness. The suggestion
that even the most controversial provisions of the regulations allow rape with impunity
speaks to a disturbingly large gap between reality and rhetoric on the topic.
Jeannie Suk Gersen, How Concerning Are the Trump Administration’s New Title IX Regulations?,
THE NEW YORKER (May 16, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/howconcerning-are-the-trump-administrations-new-title-ix-regulations/.
239. Summary of Major Provisions of the Department Of Education’s Title IX Final Rule,
DEP’T OF EDUC. 1 (May 6, 2020), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleixcomparison.pdf [hereinafter Summary of Final Rule]. Among the most constructive comments
offered on the Proposed Final Regulations were submitted by Harvard Law Professors Jeannie Suk
Gersen and Janet Halley in conjunctions with United States District Judge Nancy Gertner. Jeannie
Suk Gersen et al., Comment on Proposed Title IX Rule Making (Jan. 30, 2019),
http://etseq.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Comment-on-Proposed-Title-IX-
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The definition of unwelcome conduct constitutes a rejection of the DCL’s vague
definition of sexual harassment.240 Clause Two tracked the Supreme Court’s
definition of sexual harassment announced in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education.241
2. The Scope of the School’s Responsibility to Respond to Sexual
Harassment
The Final Rule departed from the DCL’s all-encompassing declaration of the
universities responsibility to respond to sexual harassment.242
1. The institution is required to promptly respond in a manner
that is not deliberately indifferent when it has actual
knowledge of actionable Title IX sexual harassment in an
education program or activity against a person in the United
States.243
2. The Institution is required to respond to notice of sexual
harassment or allegations thereof provided to an institution’s
Title IX Coordinator or any official . . . who has authority to
institute corrective measures on behalf of the [institution], and
“allows the institution to choose whether to have mandatory
reporting for all employees, or to designate some employees
to be confidential resources for college students to discuss
sexual harassment without automatically triggering a report
to the Title IX office.”244

Rulemaking-Gersen-Gertner-and-Halley.pdf
[hereinafter
SGH
Comments].
The SGH Comments approved of many of the regulations composed in the Final Rule but laid out
in specific detail needed revisions to regulations and provided language to improve regulations. Id.
For example, the SGH Comments offered proposed revisions to Clause Two of the definition of
sexual harassment, observing the Davis court’s definition did not encompass broader definitions of
sexual harassment articulated in earlier Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 16. Additionally, the SGH
Comments proposed broadening the language of Clause Two with substitution of the following
language: “conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive that it effectively denies a person equal
access to the recipient’s education program or activity.” Id. (emphasis in original). Additionally,
the SGH proposed that the definition of “offensive conduct” be changed to an “objectively
reasonable” standard. Id.
240. Compare the DCL’s definition of sexual harassment, supra note 45 & 46 and
accompanying text with 34 C.F.R. §106.30 (2020) (codifying the Final Rule’s definition of sexual
harassment).
241. Commentary accompanying 34 C.F.R. §106.30 (2020) (citing Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999)). See also Regulations Addressing Sexual Harassment, supra
note 237 at 449.
242. See, e.g., DCL, supra note 37, at 4 (obligating the school to responds to sexual harassment
claims “that initially occurred off school grounds, outside a school’s education program or
activity.”).
243. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a) (2020).
244. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.8(a), 106.30(a) (2020).

Winter 2022]

Will Due Process Be Returned to Academic Suspension?

149

3. “For all schools, notice to a Title IX Coordinator, or to an
official with authority to institute corrective measures on the
recipient’s behalf, charges a school with actual knowledge
and triggers the school’s response obligations.”245
4. The standard selected must be clearly published and will be
applicable to all if the location is in use by an officially
recognized student or institution organization, such as
recognized fraternity or sorority housing or athletic
housing.246
5. Colleges are only obligated to respond to reports of sexual
harassment that occurred off-campus if the location is in use
by an officially recognized student or institution organization.
Examples would be recognized fraternity or sorority housing
or athletic housing.247
Thus, the Final Rule rejected the previous (OCR) guidance documents that the
school could, in some circumstances, be held responsible based upon a standard
of merely “having reason to know” of sexual harassment.248 The DOE’s
commentary to the Rules reflects the “actual knowledge” standard as a basis for
the educational institution’s duty to respond to sexual harassment is based upon
the specific pronouncements of the Supreme Court decisions in Gebser and
Davis.249
3. Title IX Initiation Procedures & Training of Title IX Personnel
The Final Rule, while authorizing reporting of sexual harassment by third
parties, has included a requirement that the formal Title IX complaint be filed
by the party claiming harassment or the Title IX coordinator. Additionally, the
Rule restrained a decade of arbitrary practices in the investigation and
determination of sexual harassment claims by imposing mandatory training
requirements on investigators, decision-makers, and other university employees
involved in the processing of the sexual harassment claim.
1. The “complainant” is defined as the individual alleged to have
been victimized by sexual harassment.250
2. “Formal complaint” means a document filed by a
complainant or signed by the Title IX Coordinator alleging
sexual harassment against a respondent and requesting that

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id.
34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1)(vii) (2020).
34 C.F.R. § 106.44(a) (2020).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Regulations Addressing Sexual Harassment, supra note 237, at 25–30.
34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a) (2020).

150

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 71:105

the recipient investigate the allegation of sexual
harassment.251
3. The complainant, at the time of filing, “must be participating
in or attempting to participate in the education program or
activity of the school.”252
4. Third parties are authorized to report sexual harassment.253
5. “Training of Title IX personnel must include training on the
definition of sexual harassment in the Final Rule, the scope
of the school’s education program or activity, how to conduct
an investigation and grievance process including hearings,
appeals, and informal resolution processes, as applicable, and
how to serve impartially, including by avoiding prejudgment
of the facts at issue, conflicts of interest, and bias.”254
The DOE’s commentary to the Rule notes elimination of the OCR’s
“constructive knowledge” standard and restoration of an “actual knowledge”
standard as a basis for the educational institution’s duty to respond to sexual
harassment. The Department’s accompanying commentary notes the language
mirrors the liability standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Gebser and
Davis. Neither of those decisions inferred that a constructive knowledge
standard should be imposed as the basis for triggering the school’s duty to act.255
4. Investigations
The Rule additionally compelled equality of treatment for parties to the Title
IX proceeding through inclusion of numerous, precise sections governing
notifications to parties, free discovery of relevant facts, and objectivity in the
adjudication of the claim.
1. Schools must provide for both parties to have an equal
opportunity “to present fact and expert witnesses and
other inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.”256
2. Each party is afforded the right to select an advisor,
which may or may not be an attorney.257

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (distinguishing receipt of actual knowledge by the institution from those authorized to
file a formal complaint).
254. Summary of Final Rule, supra note 239, at 3–5; see also 34 C.F.R. 106.45 (b)(1)(iii)
(2020) (specifying required training for Title IX Coordinators, investigators, decision-makers and
any person facilitating the reolution process under the Rule).
255. Regulations Addressing Sexual Harassment, supra note 237, at 25–30.
256. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.45 (b)(5)(ii) (2020).
257. Id. at (b)(5)(iv).
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3. Written notice of interviews, meetings, or hearings must
be provided to both parties.258
4. The school must send written notice to the parties of
evidence directly related to the allegations within ten
days to review and respond.259
5. An investigative report must be sent to the parties that
fairly summarizes relevant evidence no later than ten
days before a response is due.260
6. “The burden of gathering evidence and the burden of
proof must remain on schools, not on the parties.”261
7. “Schools must not restrict the ability of the parties to
discuss the allegations or gather evidence (e.g., no ‘gag
order’).”262
8. “Schools must dismiss allegations of conduct that do not
meet the Final Rule’s definition of sexual harassment or
did not occur in a school’s education program or activity
against a person in the U.S. Such dismissal is only for
Title IX purposes and does not preclude the school from
addressing the conduct in any manner the school deems
appropriate.”263
9. “Schools may, in their discretion, dismiss a formal
complaint or allegations therein if the complainant
informs the Title IX Coordinator in writing that the
complainant desires to withdraw the formal complaint or
allegations therein, if the respondent is no longer
enrolled or employed by the school, or if specific
circumstances prevent the school from gathering
sufficient evidence to reach a determination.”264
10. “The Final Rule protects the privacy of a party’s
medical, psychological, and similar treatment records by
stating that schools cannot access or use such records
unless the school obtains the party’s voluntary, written
consent to do so.”265

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at (b)(5)(v).
Id. at (b)(5)(vi).
Id.
Id. at (b)(5)(vi).
Id. at (b)(5)(iii).
Id. at (b)(3)(i).
Id. at (b)(3)(ii).
Id. at (b)(5)((i); Summary of Final Rule, supra note 239, at 6.
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5. Hearings on the Charges
The Rule, with its elimination of bias and arbitrary determination of the
harassment claim through numerous strictures limiting the decision-maker’s
discretion and bias.
1. Postsecondary institutions must provide for a live hearing on
the complaint with cross-examination.266
2. The single-investigator model is eliminated. Title IX
coordinators or their employees, or the investigator of the
alleged sexual misconduct, cannot decide the claim.267
3. Each party’s advisor must be permitted to ask, in live time,
“any party or witnesses all relevant questions,” including
challenges to credibility “and follow-up questions.” Crossexamination must only be performed by the party’s advisor
and not by the party. If the party does not have an advisor,
the school must select an advisor at no charge to the party, but
the advisor does not have to be an attorney.268
4. The hearing must be conducted with the parties’ physically
present, or the school has the discretion for the parties and
witnesses to appear virtually.269
5. Either party retains the right to have the live hearing with the
parties located in separate rooms and provide, in such an
event, the technology that would allow the parties to see each
other.270
6. The school must make an audio, audio-visual recording, or
transcript of the live hearing.271
7. Rape shield protections apply. Questions concerning the
complainant’s past sexual history are deemed irrelevant
“unless offered to prove that someone other than the
respondent committed the alleged misconduct or offered to
prove consent.”272

266. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6)(i) (2020).
267. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(7)(i) (2020) (providing the same person cannot be the decisionmakers and the Title IX Coordinator). See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (describing
the single investigator model during the regime of the DCI with consolidation of the investigative
and decision-making functions in one person).
268. 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(6) (2020).
269. Id. at (b)(6)(i) (providing no statement of a party or witness can be relied upon by
decision-makers unless such party or witness is willing to submit to cross-examination at the
hearing).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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8. If a party or witness refuses to submit to cross-examination at
the hearing, the decision-makers must not rely on the party or
witnesses’ statement in reaching an ultimate decision.273
9. The school can elect between a preponderance of the evidence
standard or a higher standard of proof of the charges, such as
“clear and convincing evidence” in the determination of
sexual harassment claims. The standard selected must be
clearly published and will be applicable to all if the location
is in use by an officially recognized student or institution
organization, such as recognized fraternity, sorority, or
athletic housing.274
10. The decision-maker must issue a written determination. The
written determination must include a determination of the
decision-maker “regarding responsibility with findings of
fact, conclusions about whether the alleged conduct occurred,
the rationale for the result as to each allegation, any
disciplinary sanctions imposed on the respondent, and
whether remedies will be provided to the complainant.”275
11. “The written determination must be sent simultaneously to
the parties, along with information about how to file an
appeal.”276
V. ACADEMIA’S OPPOSITION TO THE FINAL RULE, EFFORTS TO NULLIFY THE
RULE & THE PROSPECTIVE FUTURE OF THE REGULATIONS
A. The Opposition of Academia to the Proposed Final Rule Educational as
Reflected by the American Council on Education & ATIXA (2018)
The educational institutions’ resistance to the strictures imposed by the Final
Rule and their desire to maintain singular control over their Title IX systems
developed under the DCL was encapsulated in the influential American Council
of Education’s public comments on the proposed Final Rule.277
Imposing a legalistic process will increase significantly the amount of
time that will be required to conduct a Title IX investigation and make
273. Id. at (b)(6).
274. Id. at (b)(6)(viii).
275. Id. at (b)(7)(i)–(ii).
276. Id. at (b)(7)(iii); Summary of Final Rule, supra note 239, at 7–8.
277. Ted Mitchell, Statement by ACE President Ted Mitchell on Final Title IX Regulations,
COUNCIL
ON
EDUC.
(May
6,
2020),
https://www.acenet.edu/
AM.
News-Room/Pages/Statement-by-ACE-President-Ted-Mitchell-on-Final-Title-IXRegulations.aspx [hereinafter ACE Statement]; see generally About the American Council of
Education, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., https://www.acenet.edu/About/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited Oct. 6, 2021) (confirming ACE represents approximately 1700 universities and colleges,
along with numerous other educational associations).
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a determination of responsibility. Based on the process outlined by
the [Proposed Rule], resolutions of sexual harassment and particularly
campus sexual assault could easily take months and carry over from
one semester or academic year to the next, leaving uncertainty and
wariness for the parties and perhaps for the campus community.278
ACE returned to the repeated refrain that collegiate disciplinary procedures
should not be patterned upon criminal court procedures. Particularly notable is
the objection to the Rule’s implementation of mandatory procedures designed to
afford due process to the parties:
A number of our specific concerns, such as the requirement for a live
hearing with cross-examination or the mandate giving both parties the
absolute right to inspect “all evidence…directly related” to the
allegations, vividly illustrate our overarching concern that the
[proposed rule] imposes highly legalistic, court-like processes that
conflict with the fundamental educational missions of our
institutions.279
We repeat: Colleges and universities are not law enforcement agencies
or courts. Unfortunately, the [proposed rule] consistently relies on
formal legal procedures and concepts, and imports courtroom
terminology and procedures, to impose an approach that all schools—
large and small, public and private—must follow, even if these
procedures, concepts, and terms are wildly inappropriate and
infeasible in an educational setting.280
Federal regulatory mandates will increase the costs of addressing
sexual harassment on campus. For example, banning the “single
investigator” model would force some institutions to hire additional
personnel.281
There are ways to provide a thorough and fair process for determining
the facts of a matter and a means for the parties to test the credibility
of the other party and any witnesses that do not involve a “live
hearing” with cross-examination. For example, many institutions
currently utilize procedures whereby neutral, experienced
investigators interview the parties and witnesses, pose questions that
are suggested by the parties (providing an effective substitute for

278. Letter from Ted Mitchell, President, Am. Council on Educ., to Betsy Devos, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ. 8 (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-to-EducationDepartment-on-Proposed-Rule-Amending-Title-IX-Regulations.pdf.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 22.
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direct cross-examination), and make detailed factual findings for
consideration by other individuals who serve as decision makers.282
While offering the faintest of praise to the Final Rule, ACE’s comments are
notable in their insistence on universities’ retention of control over the sexual
harassment adjudications. Equally significant are the objections to virtually
every procedural right the Final Rule affords to the accused. ACE opposes rights
of discovery, live hearings, the examination of witnesses, inclusion of a
presumption of innocence, and the abrogation of the single investigator. Such a
blanket objection requires a complete disregard of the 2018−2020 decisions
from the federal circuit courts herein reviewed.
Neither was the rejection of the Final Rule by academia confined to the realm
of university administrators, as reflected in ACE’s comments. The American
Association of Title IX Administrators (“ATIXA”) offered numerous specific
objections that collectively constituted a rejection of the entire framework of the
Final Rule.283
B. Post-Publication Responses of Academia & Democratic Legislators to the
Final Rule’s Implementation (2020)
The Final Rule’s publication predictably engendered concerted statements
from Democratic legislators predicting a new era of campus sexual violence.284
Required implementation of the Final Rule amid universities’ grappling with the
Covid-19 epidemic was exemplary of DOE’S insensitivity, according to
Democratic senators.285 ACE followed suit in characterizing the Final Rule as
“the worst in regulatory overreach.”286 The Final Rule, it contended, would
assuredly discourage sexual assault victims from reporting incidents of sexual
assault and impose a “court-like framework” on Title IX proceedings.287
ATIXA’s public statements mirrored those of ACE in condemning the Final
Rule. ATIXA’s President lamented the “weakening [of] longstanding
protections for victims/survivors” of sexual misconduct and the tragedy of
converting “what have been historically informal school disciplinary processes

282. Id. at 11.
283. See Association of Title IX Administrators (ATIXA), Comments on the U.S. Department
of Education’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulations Implementing Title IX 31–33 (Jan.
28, 2019), https://cdn.atixa.org/website-media/o_atixa/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/18120231/
ATIXA-NPRM-Comments-FInal.pdf (opposing live questioning of witnesses and parties and
opposing necessity of a live hearing or DOE’s authority to mandate live hearings).
284. See Murray, Democratic Senators Urge DeVos to Rescind Harmful Title IX Rule and
Focus on Student Safety, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LAB. & PENSIONS (June 4,
2020), https://www.help.senate.gov/ranking/newsroom/press/murray-democratic-senators-urgedevos-to-rescind-harmful-title-ix-rule-and-focus-on-student-safety/.
285. Id.
286. ACE Statement, supra note 277.
287. ACE Statement, supra note 277.
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into adversarial, quasi-criminal legal proceedings with live hearings, evidentiary
rulings and attorney-led cross-examination.”288
C. The Failure of Multiple Lawsuits Seeking Nullification of the Final Rule
Sexual assault victim advocacy groups, eighteen state attorneys general, and
the ACLU proceeded with filing four lawsuits commencing in June 2020,
seeking to enjoin DOE’s August 14th compliance date, and requesting ultimate
declarations of the Rule’s invalidity.289 These lawsuits collectively failed to
result in the issuance of any injunctive relief. Moreover, the extended opinions
denying equitable relief portend little prospect that the Rule would be judicially
overturned.
On August 9th, United States District Judge John Koeltl of the Southern
District of New York issued the first ruling in a forty-six page opinion. Judge
Koeltl denied an application for an injunction to suspend the August 14th
compliance date sought by the State of New York and New York City’s Board
of Education.290 The Court concluded the plaintiffs failed to show a substantial
likelihood of ultimately prevailing on their requested declaration that the Final
Rule was unlawful in its creation or implementation.291 Specifically, Judge
Koeltl found no basis that DOE in enacting the Final Rule: (1) was arbitrary and
capricious; (2) abused its discretion; or (3) exceeded its statutory authority.292
Neither did the plaintiffs demonstrate that irreparable injury would occur if
plaintiffs were required to comply with the August 14th deadline.293
Three days later, United States District Judge Carl Nichols of the D.C. Circuit
followed suit in denying injunctive relief seeking suspension of the August 14th
compliance date in an action initiated by seventeen state attorneys general and
the D.C. attorney general.294 Judge Nichols ultimately concluded that the
plaintiffs had neither met the standard of demonstrating a likelihood of success
on the merits, nor had plaintiffs established the element of “irreparable injury”

288. Brett A. Sokolow, New Federal Rules on Sexual Misconduct Will Only Make Things
Worse, LACROSSE TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://lacrossetribune.com/opinion/columnists/brett-asokolow-new-federal-rules-on-campus-sexual-misconduct-will-only-make-thingsworse/article_a957f3ce-1754-5649-85ef-e486e828d258.html/.
289. See, e.g., Emily Young, The 2020 Title IX Regulations and the Lawsuits Against Them:
An Analysis and Comparison, THE FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2020),
https://feminist.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Title-IX-Lawsuits-Article-1.pdf/; Zoe Kirsch, 18
States and D.C. Sue DeVos to Block Changes to Title IX Sexual Misconduct Rules, THE 74 (June 8,
2020),
https://www.the74million.org/article/18-states-and-d-c-sue-devos-to-block-changes-totitle-ix-sexual-misconduct-rules/ (identifying four lawsuits seeking to overturn the Final Rule with
accompanying analysis of the relief requested).
290. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 477 F. Supp. 3d 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
291. Id. at 294–303.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 303–05.
294. Pennsylvania v. DeVos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2020).
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in the absence of injunctive relief.295 Both of the lawsuits were dismissed in
2020 after the denials of injunctive relief.296
An ACLU-backed lawsuit initiated in a Maryland federal district court by four
advocacy groups was dismissed in October 2020 based on the plaintiffs’ lack of
standing to challenge the Final Rule.297 The only judicial relief granted has been
the declaration of the invalidity of an evidentiary provision in the course of a
federal district court decision that rejected a challenge to the entirety of the Final
Rule.298 In summarizing the failure of legal challenges to the Final Rule, the
detailed opinions issued by Judges Koeltl and Nichols are particularly
instructive. The DOE’s diligence in complying with the Administrative
Procedures Act and the exhaustive commentary and legal analysis
accompanying the rules suggest that litigants seeking a declaration of the Final
Rule’s invalidity will face a steep climb.
D. Educational Institutions’ Attempts at Circumvention of the Final Rule with
the Failure of Litigation to Postpone the Rule’s August 2020 Compliance Date
With the failure of lawsuits to delay implementation of the Final Rule,
universities have pursued other means for circumventing compliance. Some
universities have displayed “creativity” in recognizing a second category of
“sexual harassment” purportedly not subject to Title IX coverage.299
The University of Illinois’ defining of Title IX sexual harassment is
illustrative in the school’s creation of two disciplinary tracks “sexual
harassment” and “Title IX sexual harassment.”300 Conduct that university
295. Id. at 52–68.
296. Greta Anderson, N.Y. and Ed. Dept. Dismiss Title IX Rule Lawsuit, INSIDE HIGHER ED.
(Nov. 5, 2020, 03:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/11/05/ny-and-eddept-dismiss-title-ix-rule-lawsuit (reporting on the dismissal of the lawsuits brought by the State of
New York and the ACLU and noting remaining litigation challenging the Final Rule).
297. Know Your IX v. DeVos, No. CV RDB-20-01224, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194288, at
*11–12, *27 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2020).
298. Victim Rts. L. Ctr. v. Cardona, No. CV 20-11104-WGY, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140982
(D. Mass. July 28, 2021) (invalidating, as arbitrary and capricious, the Final Rule’s prohibition on
the decision-maker at Title IX grievance hearing from relying on statement of party or witness who
does not submit to cross-examination). Accord Women’s Student Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 21-CV-01626-EMC, 2021 WL 3932000, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2021) (dismissing challenge
to the Final Rule based on standing).
299. Samantha Harris & Michael Thad Allen, Universities Circumvent New Title IX
Regulations, NAT’L REV. (Sept. 7, 2020 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/09/titleix-universities-circumventing-new-rules/ (reviewing procedures such as the University of Illinois
and Arizona State University’s creation of two tracks of adjudication, only one of which seeks
compliance with the Final Rule). See generally Brett A. Sokolow, OCR Is About to Rock Our
World, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Jan 15, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2020/01/15/
how-respond-new-federal-title-ix-regulations-being-published-soon-opinion (ATIXA president
observing the necessity of litigation challenging the Final Rule plus employment of “clever workarounds” by the educational institutions).
300. Harris & Allen, supra note 299.
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bureaucrats interpret as mere “sexual harassment” eliminates many of the Final
Rule’s procedural rights guaranteed to the accused.301
E. Analysis of the Final Rule’s Endurance in Confronting Legislative
Challenges, Executive Orders, & Other Efforts at Nullification
1. The Biden Administration’s Commitment to Repeal or Significantly
Weaken the Final Rule & the Executive Order of March 8th, 2020
Joseph Biden repeatedly vowed during the presidential campaign to dismantle
the Final Rule and restore the DCL.302 This commitment was representative of
the Democratic Party generally.303 President Biden’s Executive Order of March
8, 2020,304 was characterized by many as the Biden administration’s opening
salvo in the battle to eliminate or revise the Final Rule.305 Included in the March
8th Order was the President’s specific directive for Secretary of Education
Miguel Cardona to, within 100 days, review the Final Rule for “consistency with
governing law, including Title IX” and consistency with the administration’s
policy of affording all students “an educational environment free from
discrimination . . . in the form of sexual harassment, which encompasses sexual
violence, and including discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity.”306 The Order further intimated resort to imminent executive
action to stay the Final Rule with instruction that Cardona consider remedies of
suspension, amendment, or rescission of “agency action” inconsistent with the
Biden administration’s stated policy.307
One week after issuing the March 8th order, a prominent Title IX victims
advocacy group implored Biden to suspend enforcement of the Final Rule
301. Harris & Allen, supra note 299.
302. See, e.g., The Biden Plan to End Violence Against Women, JOE BIDEN FOR PRESIDENT,
https://joebiden.com/vawa/ (noting that a Biden administration would revoke the Title IX Final
Rule and restore the DCL). Accord Robin Wilson, How a Twenty Page Letter Changed the Way
Higher Education Handles Sexual Assault, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/how-a-20-page-letter-changed-the-way-higher-educationhandles-sexual-assault/ (tracing integral role of Vice President Biden in the implementation of the
2011 DCL).
303. See, e.g., Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, 115 House Democrats Ask Cardona to Reverse the Ed
Dept’s Title IX Rule, K–12 DIVE (Mar. 3, 2021, 5:01 PM), https://www.k12dive.com/news/115house-democrats-ask-cardona-to-reverse-the-ed-depts-title-ix-rule/596165/.
304. Exec. Order No. 14,021, 14 Fed. Reg. 13,803 (Mar. 11, 2021) [hereinafter March 8th
Order] (titling the order as Guaranteeing an Educational Environment Free from Discrimination on
the Basis of Sex, Including Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity).
305. See, e.g., Collin Binkley & Aamer Madhani, Biden Order Could Change How Colleges
Handle Sexual Misconduct, AP NEWS (Mar. 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/biden-policiescolleges-sexual-misconduct-42501afa9dcfc06602b7cc57b97080f4 (characterizing the order as a
“…first step toward reversing a contentious Trump administration policy”).
306. March 8th Order, supra note 304 (concluding with reference to commencement of a notice
and comment period in conjunction with other remedies for elimination of the Final Rule).
307. March 8th Order, supra note 304.
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immediately.308 However, the following examination of various remedies for
interim suspension of the Final Rule confirms that the Biden administration’s
sole lawful path for eliminating the Rule has always been replaced through the
protracted process of legislative rulemaking by the DOE.309 The many
prognostications of the imminent demise of the Final Rule accompanying
Biden’s election were greatly exaggerated.
2. Executive Orders or OCR “Clarifications” as a Means of Carving Back
the Final Rule
President Biden has displayed unprecedented enthusiasm for utilizing
executive orders to eliminate many Trump administration’s policies.310
However, executive orders cannot be employed to override or nullify existing
law.311 The Final Rule, enacted following the notice and comment requirements
of Section 553 of the APA, is binding law, commensurate statutes, and immune
from nullification by executive order.312 Neither can OCR issue guidance
documents or interpretive pronouncements for purposes of amending or
revoking the Final Rule.313
3. Statutory Override of the Final Rule—The Congressional Review Act &
the Senate Filibuster
Initial predictions suggested that a Democratic majority in Congress would
resort to the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) as a basis for repeal of the Final
Rule.314 The CRA requires submission of administrative regulations to both

308. See Tyler Kingkade, Activists Increase Pressure on Biden to Scrap DeVos’ Title IX Rules,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2021, 12:00 PM) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/activistsincrease-pressure-biden-scrap-betsy-devos-title-ix-rules-n1261017 (highlighting report of Know
Your IX calling for immediate suspension of the Final Rule).
309. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (providing for administrative rule making with notice and
publication).
310. Christopher Hickey et. al., Here Are the Executive Orders Biden Signed in His First 100
Days, CNN (Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2021/politics/biden-executiveorders/ (observing Biden’s execution of more than 60 executive actions with 24 directed at
eradicating Trump policies).
311. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (observing the prohibition on a president’s power to override duly enacted laws by
resort to executive order).
312. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Legislative rules
have the ‘force and effect of law’ and may be promulgated only after public notice and comment.”)
(citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 986 n. 19 (1983)); Nat’l. Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816
F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that “a valid legislative rule is binding upon all persons,
and on the courts, to the same extent as a congressional statute”).
313. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 101 (2015) (holding that the APA
“mandate[s] that agencies use the same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they used
to issue the rule in the first instance”).
314. The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2018).
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houses of Congress and the Comptroller General.315 The law’s procedure for
eliminating a final rule requires only a simple majority vote by both chambers
on a joint resolution to disapprove, followed by the president’s approval.316
However, the Final Rule’s abolition through the CRA ultimately was precluded
by the statute’s strict time deadlines, given the May 2020 implementation
date.317
With the employment of the CRA time-barred, resorting to traditional
congressional legislation to amend or replace the CRA has never constituted a
viable option. Legislative procedures are tedious and time-consuming.318
Moreover, Democrats would be precluded from securing a passage of such
legislation in the Senate, given the power of Senate Republicans to block a final
vote by resorting to the filibuster.319 The recent, widespread support in the
Democratic party to eliminate the Senate filibuster has been consistently
thwarted by Senators Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of
Arizona throughout the first six months of the Biden administration.320

315. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2018).
316. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)–(2), § 802 (2018) (setting forth the procedure for a congressional
joint resolution under the Act and resulting elimination of a final rule in effect or preclusion of a
final rule that has not taken effect). See generally, MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, (2020) (describing in detail all the sections of the CRA).
317. See 5 U.S.C. § 802 (setting forth time limitations for joint resolutions under the CRA).
See generally Jackie Gharapour Wernz, What Comes Next? Title IX Under a Biden Presidency, JD
SUPRA (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-comes-next-title-ix-under-abiden-95583/ (reviewing the pros, cons, and time restrictions in prospectively utilizing the CRA to
eliminate the Title IX Final Rule).
318. See How a Bill Becomes a Law, USHISTORY.ORG, https://www.ushistory.org/gov/6e.asp
(tracing the procedure by which a bill ultimately is enacted into law and observing the constitutional
framers intentionally created a legislative system requiring consideration and deliberation) (last
visited Oct. 22, 2021).
319. See Molly E. Reynolds, What is the Senate Filibuster, and What Would it Take to
Eliminate It?, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/
votervital/what-is-the-senate-filibuster-and-what-would-it-take-to-eliminate-it/.
320. See Kyrsten Sinema, Opinion, We Have More to Lose than Gain by Ending the Filibuster,
WASH. POST (June 21, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/21/kyrstensinema-filibuster-for-the-people-act/ (explaining Senator Sinema’s reasoning in consistently
opposing elimination of the filibuster); Biden Lifts the Curtain, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-lifts-the-curtain-11616711995 (covering Biden press
conference in which he “toed the Democratic Line” in expressing his support for ending the Senate
filibuster); Alexander Heffner, Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema are Holding American
Democracy Hostage, INDEP. UK (Mar. 5, 2021, 12:27 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
voices/democrats-filibuster-krysten-sinema-joe-manchin-b1812727.html, (describing the necessity
of a unanimous Democrat vote in the Senate to repeal the filibuster and protesting the obstacle
created by Senators Manchin and Sinema).
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4. Suspension of Enforcement of the Final Rule
President Biden’s March 2021 raising the specter of suspension of the Final
Rule has not proceeded to actual executive action as of July 2021.321 The
apparent decision to forego suspension of enforcement is prudent given the
entirely predictable consequences that would follow.
The results of
nonenforcement would be disastrous for universities, thereby emboldened to
forego live hearings or other procedures mandated by the Final Rule. Willful
disregard of the Final Rule would inevitably increase the frequency of John Doe
lawsuits. However, the Does would bear a far lesser burden as schools would
be defending deliberate deprivation of legally mandated rights for the
accused.322
5. The Limitations of Due Process and the Possible Effect of the Trump’s
Recasting of the Federal Judiciary
The recognition of expanded constitutional rights for the accused in Baum and
subsequent federal appellate decisions limit the degree to which the Biden
administration can carve back on fundamental procedural guarantees owed the
accused and included in the Final Rule.323 The Trump administration has likely
materially altered the federal judiciary’s prevailing jurisprudential philosophy
with confirmation of over 220 Article III judges, including three associate
justices of the Supreme Court, fifty-four circuit court judges, and 174 federal
district court judges.324 Admittedly, little empirical evidence exists on Title IX
rulings by recent Trump appointments to the federal bench. Nevertheless, the
enhanced vetting of prospective Republican judicial appointments may yield
greater scrutiny on claims implicating rights owed the Title IX accused.325
321. See Sokolow, EO, EO, It’s Off To Work We Go: How the Latest Biden Executive Order
Will Impact the Title IX Field, infra note 345 and accompanying text.
322. See Wernz, supra note 317. A significant federal decision was issued in November 2020,
concluding that the Final Rule would be applicable to a proceeding in which the plaintiff sought
redress for the university’s disciplinary proceeding occurring prior to the Final Rule’s
implementation date of August 14, 2020 and both parties consented to proceeding under the new
rule. Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., No. 1:20-CV-1185, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191676, at
*1, *40–41 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2020).
323. See discussion supra Section III.C.(3).
324. John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in Appointing
Federal Judges, PEW RSCH. CENTER (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-with-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/
(observing Trump’s unprecedented judicial confirmations in a four year presidential term, nearing
Obama’s confirmations in an eight year term). See also, Colby Itkowitz, 1 in Every 4 Circuit Court
Judges is Now a Trump Appointee, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/one-in-every-four-circuit-court-judges-is-now-a-trump-appointee/2019/12/21/
d6fale98-2336-11ea-bed5-80264cc91a9_story.html.
325. See generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme Court, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/the-conservativepipeline-to-the-supreme-court (tracing the ascendency of the Federalist Society in Trump’s judicial
selections through vetting the judicial philosophy of prospective federal judicial appointments and
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Recently the United Supreme Court denied certiorari on a case seeking
reconciliation of divergent federal appellate rulings on the plausible pleading of
the Title IX reverse discrimination claim.326 If the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on a case to clarify Title IX pleading requirements or due process
owed in campus proceedings, an emerging conservative majority, including
Justices Kavanaugh and Coney Barrett, would likely be receptive to arguments
favoring the accused.327
6. DOE’s Regulatory Replacement of the Final Rule through the APA with
Notice & Publication
Replacement of the Final Rule by DOE’s legislative rulemaking would be
arduous, time-consuming, and would require retracing the procedural path that
culminated in enacting the Final Rule.328 The Biden Administration’s only
remedy of replacement through legislative rulemaking is a tribute to the Final
Rule’s precise drafting and meticulous compliance with the APA’s procedures
culminating in its 2020 enactment.329
7. The Biden Administration’s 2021 Decision to Proceed with the APA’s
Publication, Notice, & Comment Procedure in Pursuing Replacement of the
Title IX Final Rule
Announcements by the Department of Education, occurring after preparation
of the foregoing review of options, confirms that the legislative rulemaking
procedure will be exclusively pursued in seeking to eradicate the Final Rule.
The administration’s options merit review. Specifically, in April 2021, the
creating lists of candidates confirmed as originalist from which Trump selected nominees.). But
see, Ronald L. Feinman, These 9 Justices Failed to Vote the Way Their Party Expected, HIST. NEWS
NETWORK (Oct 14, 2018), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/170179 (reviewing judicial
appointments from William Brennan through trough David Souter that adopted judicial
philosophies contrary to that expected by the Republican administrations).
326. Rossley v. Drake Univ., 979 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-1083, 2021
U.S. LEXIS 1589 (2021).
327. See supra, notes 178–99 and accompanying text (reviewing then Seventh Circuit Judge
Coney Barrett’s opinion in Purdue University); but see, McKay Coppins, Is Brett Kavanaugh Out
for Revenge?, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/06/
brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court/618717/ (concluding that the effects of Justice Kavanaugh’s
confirmation hearing, with accusations of attempted rape, remains a mystery).
328. See Jessica Lee & Christina T. Pham, Biden Administration Expected to Reverse DeVos’s
Title IX Regulations, Legal Experts Say, HARV. CRIMSON (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.
thecrimson.com/article/2021/1/20/experts-on-title-ix-under-biden/ (noting Harvard law professor
Jacob Gersen’s observation that an administrative regulation would require compliance with the
same process followed by the DOE in enactment of the Final Rule including the public notice and
comment period, thus constituting an “onerous process” that would take years).
329. See Greta Anderson, A Long and Complicated Road Ahead, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 22,
2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/01/22/biden-faces-title-ix-battle-complicatedpolitics-and-his-own-history (observing the Biden administration cannot simply summarily revoke
the Final Rule given enactment of the Final Rule as a binding law).
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Department issued a letter to “Students, Educators, and other Stakeholders”
concerning future steps to be taken in furtherance of the directives of the March
8th Order.330 The letter announced upcoming public hearings in which
interested parties could participate in “sharing views” with the OCR in
furtherance of Secretary Cardona’s comprehensive review directed by the March
8th Executive Order.331
The more significant revelation in the letter was its announcement of intended
future rulemaking with no accompanying suggestion of interim remedies to
suspend or alter the Final Rule:
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Anticipated)
After hearing from the public and completing its review of the
Department’s current Title IX regulations and other agency actions,
OCR anticipates publishing in the Federal Register a notice of
proposed rulemaking to amend the Department’s Title IX regulations.
This notice will provide individuals, organizations, schools, and other
members of the public with an additional opportunity to share insights
and views through a formal notice-and-comment period.332
The conclusion that the Biden administration will pursue the APA’s formal rulemaking process to replace the Final Rule was subsequently confirmed by
Secretary Cardona’s testimony before the House Labor and Education
Committee on June 24, 2021.333 Congressman Frank Mrvan inquired about what
the Department was doing to remedy the “disastrous effects” of the Final Rule’s
supposed weakening of protections for sexual harassment survivors.334 In
response, Cardona referred exclusively to the Department’s present pursuit of
the formal rulemaking process, making no mention of any contemplated interim
remedies to be pursued.335 The decision of the Biden administration to
singularly pursue the APA’s formal rulemaking process is a tribute to the
precision in crafting the Rule’s specific procedures to be followed in Title IX
investigations and adjudications. The Final Rule’s language precludes material
dilution of its exacting directives by resorting to OCR “guidance documents.”
330. Letter from Suzanne B. Goldberg, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
Office
for
C.R.,
to
Title
IX
Coordinators
(Apr.
6,
2021)
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/correspondence/stakeholders/20210406-titleix-eo14021.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Goldberg] (titling the notice Letter to Students, Educators, and
other Stakeholders re Executive Order). See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text (reviewing
the contents of the March 8th Order).
331. Letter from Goldberg, supra note 330, at 2 (referencing the March 8th Executive Order).
332. Letter from Goldberg, supra note 330, at 3.
333. House Hearing on Department of Education Priorities, CSPAN (June 24, 2021)
https://www.c-span.org/video/?512743-1/house-hearing-department-education-priorities
[hereinafter Dep’t of Educ. Priorities] (recording questioning of Congressman Frank Mrvan from
the 1st District of Indiana).
334. Id.
335. Id. (recording response of Dep’t of Educ. Sec’y Miguel Cardona to questioning of
Congressman Mrvan).
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Additionally, given recent federal appellate decisions, the DOE is aware of the
likely disastrous consequences of a wholesale elimination or suspension of the
rights afforded to the accused under recent appellate decisions.336 The clarity
provided by the Final Rule effectively prevents the Biden administration from
employing tactics to circumvent the legislative rulemaking process.337
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING ACADEMIA’S RESISTANCE
TO THE FINAL RULE
A. Academia’s Ostensibly Laudable Goals & Its Failure to Recognize Tragic
Results
As noted at the commencement of this article, no one denies the merit of
limiting the incidence of sexual assault on college campuses. Equally
commendable is zealously pursuing justice for collegians that are victims of sex
crimes.338 Unfortunately, pursuing these objectives by depriving due process to
those accused of sexual assault merely increases injustice, ultimately expanding
the community of victims on college campuses. To the extent reflected by ACE
and ATIXA, the academe’s response turns a blind eye to 600 John Doe lawsuits
and the repeated warnings of federal appellate courts concerning due process
rights owed to the Title IX accused.339 The remarkably similar depictions of
Kafkaesque disciplinary proceedings reiterated by hundreds of collegiate males
cannot be dismissed as anecdotal aberrations.340 Unfortunately, the academe
predominantly appears to deny the existence of any such defects in collegiate
justice systems.341 The forces and motivations underlying academia’s resistance
to the Final Rule’s reforms merit further inquiry.

336. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.45(b)(1) (2020) (providing in the Final Rule a 446-word
delineation of the mandatory live hearing at postsecondary institutions and the procedures to be
followed in the hearing).
337. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULE MAKING
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 1, 10 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41546.pdf (observing “in order
to amend or repeal an existing legislative rule, an agency generally must comply with the same
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, outlined in § 553 of the APA, that governed the
original promulgation of the rule”).
338. Whether the number of sexual misconduct incidents is inflated does not detract from the
pursuit to reduce the incidence of sexual violence on campus.
339. See supra notes 277–83 and accompanying text (reviewing Statements of ACE and
ATIXA criticizing the Final Rule).
340. See, e.g., Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 583–86 (6th Cir. 2020); Doe v. Univ. of
Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 205–08 (3d Cir. 2020); Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656–58 (7th Cir.
2019). See generally Our Stories, FACE, https://facecampusequality.org/ourt-stories (last visited
Oct. 10, 2021) (reporting personal accounts of the suffering endured by approximately 1,000 males
and their families resulting from false Title IX accusations of sexual harassment).
341. Mitchell, supra notes 278–79 (reviewing Statements of ACE); Association of Title IX
Administrators, supra note 283 (urging retention of the single investigator and lamenting the
destructiveness of live hearings and examinations of the Title IX accuser in the face of federal
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B. The Continuing Influence of Title IX Offices on College Campuses
Under the Obama administration, the OCR successfully established the sex
bureaucracy on college campuses. The Title IX coordinator is now a campus
fixture with expanded duties and supporting staff.342 The permanence and
influence of the expanded Title IX office are attributable to the desire for
continued employment and the desire of Title IX officers to revise the rules
governing acceptable sexual etiquette on campuses. Civil servants are certainly
not immune from the human tendency to seek job security.343 Moreover, many
Title IX coordinators find vocational enthusiasm in their allegiance to the OCR’s
vision of educating collegians with a new paradigm of sexual politics freed from
prevailing sexual mores and historic law defining sexual crimes.344 The
response of ATIXA to the Final Rule confirms that OCR’s mission remained
unfazed by the Trump administration.345 The Title IX campus office remains an
influential force that frequently and aggressively disseminates its message of
new parameters for lawful sexual interaction.
C. Consideration of Academia’s Cost Objections to the Final Rule, The
Burden of Adherence with the Final Rule & Attendant Complexity in Judging
Serious Legal Disputes
Objections concerning the costliness of implementing the Final Rule training
and compliance with its many procedural requirements have validity. The
circuit opinions concluding the Title IX accused is constitutionally owed a live hearing and
examination of the accuser).
342. See, e.g., Alison Somin, Opinion, To Cripple the Abusive Campus “Sex Bureaucracy,”
Reign in the Title IX Coordinators, THE HILL (July 31, 2020, 09:00 AM), https://thehill.com/
opinion/education/509676-to-cripple-the-abusive-campus-sex-bureaucracy-rein-in-the-title-ix
(describing enactment in 1975 of a single administrative regulation requiring one Title IX
coordinator and the evolution of the one employee mandate reflected in extended Title IX offices
at universities); Melnick, supra note 19 (noting the expansive Title IX staffs at Yale and Harvard
and federal expenditures of more than $100 million with much dedicated to campus Title IX
personnel).
343. See, e.g., RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 154 (1994) (noting the 100-year growth in civil
servant job security through rules and public unions facilitating and preserving a system
characterized by promotion through time served versus productivity and creation of barriers to the
dismissal of unproductive employees).
344. See Melnick, supra note 19, at 30 (describing Title IX campus workshops devoted to
reeducating students with new concepts of acceptable and unacceptable sexual conduct and
appropriate discourse on sex); Somin, supra note 342 (observing the practice of Title IX
coordinators lecturing on appropriate sexual interaction); see also Yang, supra note 35 (describing
the new vision of appropriate sexual conduct advocated by the OCR).
345. Brett A. Sokolow, EO, EO, It’s Off To Work We Go: How the Latest Biden Executive
Order Will Impact the Title IX Field, ATIXA (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.atixa.org/blog/howbiden-eo-will-impact-title-ix/ (discussing impact of March 8, 2021 executive order and
summarizing “President Biden is sending instructions for ED to huddle with its lawyers and those
in the DOJ to try to figure out the most expedient way to wiggle out of or around the 2020
Regulations,” and suggesting means to dilute the Final Rule’s impact pending a final strategy).
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various aspects of compliance with the Final Rule require attention to detail and
substantially more expenditures than an informal disciplinary proceeding with
few prescribed rules.346 The Final Rule’s process is time-consuming and
requires additional costs to ensure all parties have equal access and participation
in the school’s investigation. The process further aims to ensure a strict division
of the individual or staff investigating the Title IX claim from those charged with
the claim. The same is true of coordinating and conducting live hearings with
the examination of all relevant witnesses and subsequent preparation of detailed
findings of fact supporting the ultimate decision of the Title IX claim. It requires
far less effort and funding to determine Title IX claims through informal
interviews with a single investigator who is unfettered by rules governing the
investigation or the means for dispensing an ultimate verdict. Thus, resistance
to the Final Rule and compliance with its numerous procedural requirements
may well reflect resistance to departing with the familiar by many engaged in
Title IX disciplinary proceedings. Abandoning a system of adjudication that one
has become familiar with over several years is difficult. This is particularly true
when the new system to be adopted is laden with multiple procedural
requirements that include more steps on the path to procedural compliance.347
It is equally valid that many who are delegated the task of Title IX
adjudications are fatigued with the whipsawing that has occurred and will likely
occur again, with changing presidential administrations pursuing radically
different agendas. Those charged with adjudicating Title IX claims on campus
seek clarity and finality regarding the procedures and presumptions to be
adopted in performing the mission.348
There is additional merit in the contention that Title IX panels should not be
transformed into courts of law. Faculty members or other Title IX panel
members rarely will have the legal training to deal with the complexities of
resolving complex Title IX disputes. Determinations of consent, weighing the
relative evidentiary value of recollections frequently clouded in alcoholic fogs,
and the task of ferreting out the truth among two or more conflicting accounts
illustrate the difficulties inherent in the assigned task. Neither should laypeople
be called upon to resolve such disputes. This is not their chosen vocation, and
346. Summary of Final Rule, supra note 239 (setting forth with specificity the Final Rule’s
many procedural requirements in the investigation and adjudication of a Title IX claim).
347. See Anderson, A Long and Complicated Road Ahead, supra note 329 (observing the
fatigue and lack of certainty among those that are engaged with Title IX adjudications with the
radical change of procedural guidance between the DCL and the Final Rule encompassed in the
observation, “[w]e’re tired…Don’t give us one more thing to do this academic year. Let us get our
students back to as close as we can to normal.”).
348. See, e.g., Jake New, Must vs. Should, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/25/colleges-frustrated-lack-clarification-title-ixguidance (reviewing colleges frustrations, during the DCL era, with OCR’s contradictory positions
on DCL directive as mandatory versus nonbinding guidance with senior vice president of ACE
noting, “I think the challenge that colleges and universities have is the Department of Education is
saying a large number of very different things about the guidance and what it means.”).
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the stakes are remarkably high. The ultimate decision could result in lifechanging consequences for the accuser or the accused.
There are alternative means of resolving Title IX disputes short of invoking
the criminal justice system or requiring implementation of the admittedly
demanding procedures of the Final Rule. Some have written persuasively of
establishing regional dispute centers where trained professionals could counsel
victims, impartially investigate and adjudicate Title IX cases, and decide them
with the privacy of an arbitration proceeding.349 Perhaps an even more
economical system could allow an initial hearing of the case by a collegiate
tribunal analogous to a justice of the peace proceeding. However, both parties
would reserve the right to appeal and secure a de novo hearing at the regional
center with trained professionals. Such a system might result in cost savings by
allowing early resolution to more straightforward cases such as where the parties
stipulate to the events that occurred, or where overwhelming evidence supports
a ruling.
D. The Faint-Hearted Collegiate Administrations
Ultimately, school administrators share much of the blame for the increased
time and expenditures in complying with the Final Rule. Under the DCL, OCR
was undoubtedly a force to be feared, given an unlimited investigatory budget
and threatening the withdrawal of federal funding. Nevertheless, it was
academia’s election to appease the OCR by subjugating fairness to institutional
preservation. Universities were repeatedly provided notice in federal decisions
from 2016 through 2020 that their systems were inequitable and constitutionally
deficient.350 The ever-growing flood of John Doe lawsuits provided a warning
that reforming campus Title IX systems to further equality of treatment and
impartiality was advisable. Nevertheless, there was no demonstrable movement
towards voluntary reform.351 Nothing precluded educational institutions from

349. See Gina Maisto Smith & Leslie M. Gomez, The Regional Center for Investigation and
Adjudication: A Proposed Solution to the Challenges of Title IX Investigations in Higher
Education, 120 PA. STATE L. REV. 978, 997–98 (2016).
350. See supra notes 115–24, 137–215 and accompanying text (reviewing numerous federal
decisions during the 2016–2020 period observing constitutional deficiencies in DCL proceedings).
351. Compare Spotlight on Due Process 2017, supra note 217 (surveying disciplinary systems
in fifty-three leading universities) with Spotlight on Due Process 2019-2020, supra note 217
(surveying disciplinary systems in fifty-three leading universities leading universities. The 2017
survey reviewed and graded the universities on ten separate elements of fundamental due process
in Title IX proceedings such as whether the school required impartial fact finders and whether some
form of cross examination was allowed in the proceeding. Forty-six of the fifty-three schools were
graded at D and F as affording less than four out of ten elements of fundamental due process with
seventy-three percent of the schools guaranteeing no presumption of innocence. In summarizing
the 2019–20 survey, FIRE concluded the following, “Disappointingly, we did not see a significant
change overall in the safeguards the rated universities guarantee students from 2017 through this
year.”).
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initiating litigation seeking a declaration of the OCR’s unlawful enforcement of
the DCL as faux law.352
Unfortunately, recent events corroborate that college administrators are
generally reticent to take courageous stands that would engender substantial
opposition among vociferous elements of the student bodies or disapproval from
governmental agencies charged with some aspect of educational oversight.353
E. The Role of Institutional Preservation
Understandably, universities are driven by self-preservation in their
competition for funding, increased endowments, and student enrollment year.354
The challenges confronted by educational institutions have been highlighted by
COVID-19 and the resulting financial strain on universities.355 Yet, the COVID19 crisis may well have served a beneficial purpose in requiring universities to
refocus upon their ultimate mission and making long-overdue changes in an
antiquated system.356 There was substantial evidence long before the pandemic
that schools had ironically lost primary focus on the student in pursuit of
increasing enrollment and funding.357
352. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 4, Doe v. Lhamon, No. 1:16-cv-01158- RC (D.D.C.
Aug. 15, 2016) (joining voluntarily as a plaintiff, Oklahoma Wesleyan University became only
publicly funded university to challenge the legality of the DCL directives—case subsequently
rendered moot with revocation of DCL).
353. See, e.g., L.D. Burnett, Right-Wing Trolls Attacked Me, My Administration Buckled,
CHRON. HIGHER ED (Oct. 15, 2020) (essay on cowardice of the corporate institution); Glenn
Greenwald (@ggrewald), TWITTER (May 11, 2019, 09:29 PM), https://twitter.com/
ggreenwald/status/1127385246087905280?lang=en (criticizing refusal of Harvard administration
to support Dean of Harvard Law School in face of student protests over the Dean’s legal
representation of Harvey Weinstein); Dennis Prager, The Cowards of Academia, CREATORS
SYNDICATE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.creators.com/read/dennis-prager/04/17/the-cowards-ofacademia (lamenting the refusal of college administrators to demand free speech on campuses with
the phenomena of student protests docking scheduled conservative speakers). But see Robert J.
Zimmer et. al., Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression, UNIV. OF CHI. COMM. ON FREE
EXPRESSION (July 2014),
https://provost.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/FOECommitteeReport.pdf
(announcing University of Chicago President and committee’s authentic commitment to diversity
of thought and freedom of speech as primary values that will be preserved at the institution and
responding to campus protests as some who would find speech disagreeable or wrong-headed).
354. See, e.g., More States Rely on Tuition Revenue to Finance Public Education, ASS’N. AM.
COLL. & UNIVS. (May 2018), https://www.aacu.org/aacu-news/newsletter/2018/may/facts-figures
(observing that over half of public universities in fiscal year 2017 relied more heavily on student
tuition that state and local appropriations as the source of operational funding).
355. See, e.g., Dick Startz, Coronavirus Poses Serious Financial Risks to US Universities,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/
2020/04/21/coronavirus-poses-serious-financial-risks-to-us-universities/.
356. See Stephen Mintz, The Crisis Higher Education Needs, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 17,
2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/higher-ed-gamma/crisis-higher-education-needs/.
357. See, e.g., Laura McKenna, The Forgotten Student: Has Higher Education Stiffed its Most
Important Client?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2012/04/the-forgotten-student-has-higher-education-stiffed-its-most-important-
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University administrations’ reactions to the pressures of the OCR in pursuing
DCL enforcement are symbolic of the “forgotten student” at educational
institutions. College administrators elected to avoid the costly prospect of an
OCR investigation or challenging the agency’s illegal enforcement of mere
“guidance letters” by sacrificing fairness to accused students in the disciplinary
proceedings. The emotional damage and disruption of a secondary education
visited on collegians who thereby suffered false verdicts of guilt on Title IX
harassment claims was the price to be paid for fending off the OCR.
F. The Law of Rules for Just Title IX Adjudications
America’s commitment to the “rule of law” is commonly summarized in
Theodore Roosevelt’s pronouncement that “[n]o man is above the law, and no
man is below it.”358 The rule of law renounces subjective adjudications and
rejects the parties’ identity or affiliations as irrelevant to resolving a legal
controversy. It pursues equality of treatment by ultimate reliance on fixed
principles applicable to all societal members. Essential to the rule of law are
rules dedicated to restraining a judge’s unfettered discretion.359 This preference
for reliance on law and not human discretion is traceable to Aristotle:
Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign; and personal
rule, whether it be exercised by a single person or a body of persons,
should be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable,
owing to the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies,
to make an exact pronouncement.360
DCL’s directives, ranging from the preponderance of the evidence to its vague
definitions of prohibited speech and conduct, were designed to maximize the
Title IX collegiate judge’s maximum latitude in rendering a verdict on
harassment claims. In contrast, the raison d’etre of the Final Rule, with its many
procedural checks, was to quell the decision-maker’s discretion that had led to
the inequities of the Title IX systems. Injustice in adjudication, regardless of
venue, is most prone to occur when the rule of law is abandoned.
Those that decide bona fide disputes, regardless of whether a trial court,
regional Title IX adjudication center, or college disciplinary tribunal, are

client/255445/ (documenting how universities have sacrificed and diminished the quality of
classroom teaching with emphasis on faculty publication in the pursuit of institutional recognition
and advanced rankings); Douglas Belkin & Scott Thurm, Deans List: Hiring Spree Fattens College
Bureaucracy––And Tuition, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887323316804578161490716042814 (documenting the dramatic increase in hiring of
university administrators vis a vis teachers and the dramatic costs increases attendant to the trend).
358. Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 7, 1903).
359. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176–
77 (1989).
360. Id. at 1176 (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, BOOK III, ch. xi, § 19 at
127 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford 1946)).
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humans.361 They are fallible and prone to make decisions premised upon their
prejudices, personal beliefs, and life experiences. These errors in judgment are
not acts of malice. They are manifestations of humans’ limitations in rendering
fair and impartial decisions absent rules to curb human imperfections.
Entrusting Title IX adjudications to a “human honor system” with few legal
safeguards and reliance on “trust me, I’ll do the right thing” is a hazardous
course.362 This is confirmed by the hundreds of John Doe lawsuits and the
judiciary’s growing interventions herein reviewed. These legal limitations are
particularly appropriate when life-changing penalties are in play. Perhaps there
was only one actual check for college “deciders” who strayed from duty. That
countervailing power came with those John Doe lawsuits that fortuitously landed
on the benches of judges with an understanding of what was transpiring in the
collegiate tribunals.
Discretion cannot be wholly removed from adjudications. Those that are
hearing the Title IX cases are not solving math problems. Nevertheless, the
Final Rule seeks to reform systems that too frequently rendered judgments that
bore little or no correlation to evidence and denying fundamental procedural
fairness. The many checks of the Final Rule serve not only the purpose of
limiting discretion. Requirements, such as the mandatory preparation of a
reasoned decision, compel the decision-maker to stop and reflect on whether the
ultimate judgment was the product of a fair process based on the evidence
presented.363
CONCLUSION
The ultimate goals of collegiate systems must be two-fold. No one would
deny that sexual harassment, including rape and other violent acts, occurs on
college campuses. The most frequent victims of sexual assault in America are
women between the ages of 18 and 24.364 An environment must prevail whereby
victims can report such incidents without fear of not being taken seriously. Of
equal importance is the maintenance of adjudicatory systems dedicated to
objective determinations of sexual assault claims by impartial panels.
361. See Smith & Gomez, supra note 349 at 997–98 (suggesting alternative means of resolving
Title IX cases by those trained in the law as opposed to imposing the law of rules on untrained
faculty of other collegiate personnel).
362. See Sokolow, EO, EO, It’s Off To Work We Go: How the Latest Biden Executive Order
Will Impact the Title IX Field, supra note 345 and accompanying text.
363. See generally, Julia Ward Howe Quotes, QUOTEHD, http://www.quotehd.com/quotes/
julia-ward-howe-activist-the-strokes-of-the-pen-need-deliberation-as-much-as-the (“The strokes
of the pen need deliberation as much as the sword needs swiftness.”).
364. Rape and Sexual Assault Victimization Among College-Age Females, 1995-2013, DEP’T
OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (2014), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf
9513.pdf (demonstrating there is no evidence reflecting that the incidence of sexual assault is higher
for women attending college that those not attending.); Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., Evaluating
the One-in-Five Statistic: Women’s Risk of Sexual Assault While in College, 54 J. SEX RSCH. 546,
572 (2017) (validating the 1-in-5 statistic of incidence).
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The Biden administration was prudent in its decision to forego interim
measures and pursue replacement of the Final Rule with legislative rulemaking
in compliance with the APA’s notice and comment procedures. The resulting
transparency in the legislative process with public comment will hopefully
replace the Final Rule with legislation that preserves equality of treatment for
parties and adherence to the due process owed in Title IX collegiate proceedings.
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